This do in Remembrance of me. *Luke* XXII, 19.

LONDON:
Printed & Sold by JAMES MECHELL *at his Printing Office the* King's Arms *in* Fleetstreet.

This do in Remembrance of me. *Luke* XXII, 19.

LONDON:
Printed & Sold by JAMES MECHELL *at his Printing Office the* King's Arms *in* Fleetstreet.

Mirror K

THE MIRROUR:

OR, A

CHAIN of REFLECTIONS,

Founded on True Moral Principles;

WHEREIN ARE

RULES laid down for the Conduct and Œconomy of Life, for promoting true Happineſs by the Regulation of the Paſſions, and the Practice of every ſocial Virtue.

Extracted partly

From the moſt celebrated AUTHORS,

JOINED TO

A Series of Obſervations on Mankind.

BEING

A Compleat SYSTEM of ETHICKS.

WHEREIN

The many *Exceptions*, ſo juſtly cenſured in the Maxims of that celebrated *French* Moraliſt the Duke of *Rochefoucault*, are carefully avoided.

Homo qui erranti comiter monſtrat viam,
Quaſi lumen de ſuo Lumine accendat, facit,
Nihil ominus, ipſi luceat, cum illi accenderit.

LONDON:
Printed for W. OWEN, at HOMER'S-HEAD, near TEMPLE-BAR.

M.DCC.LIX.

BRITISH MUSEUM

THE

PREFACE.

REFLECTIONS of this nature, founded on the true principles of *Religion* and *Morality*, are of ſuch univerſal benefit to mankind, that they have been greatly favoured and encouraged by men of the moſt ſolid underſtandings and refined education, and often preferred before works of a more elaborate kind; and for this reaſon, that their excellence conſiſts in a triteneſs of expreſſion peculiarly adapted to this kind of writing; and have

employed the pens of many eminent men, as greatly tending to improve the morals, and reform the looſe and vicious habits in young and tender minds, and ſet vice and virtue in their proper colours. For as the mirrour reflects the body, and renders all our perſonal deformities evidently conſpicuous; ſo theſe equally expoſe the inmoſt receſſes of the mind, the ſeat of all our darling vices and paſſions; and convinces us we have thoſe errors and foibles in our compoſition, which we were ſtrangers to before, from too fond a partiality and the want of a thorough knowledge of ourſelves.

This kind of writing was in much eſteem, as the true *utile dulci* of the antients, even in the earlieſt times, though too much neglected by our modern writers, and often thrown aſide for works of a more infe-

rior

rior nature, and which rather ſerve to vitiate than improve our reaſoning faculties; and I am convinced, that nothing can be better calculated, or contribute more to form the minds of youth, and give them a juſt conception of mankind and the world.

The moral writer, who copies from real life, and makes the mind of man, that intricate labyrinth, his conſtant ſtudy, muſt certainly arrive in time at that knowledge and perfection, which cannot fail of improving the underſtanding, and making us both wiſer and better for ſuch inſtructions.

The judicious Mr. *Addiſon*, ſo deſervedly as well as univerſally eſteemed by all admirers of polite literature, in one of his moral eſſays, ſetting forth the many and ſingular advantages ariſing from education, and bewailing the misfortune of thoſe who have

been unhappy enough *not* to be born in a nation where wiſdom and knowledge flouriſh, concludes his diſcourſe (after having illuſtrated his argument by an example or two) with recommending ſuch works as are an incitement to virtue, and have any tendency to moral inſtruction. Theſe are his words: *Diſcourſes on morality, and reflections on human nature, are the beſt means we can make uſe of to improve our minds and gain a true knowledge of ourſelves, and conſequently to recover our ſouls out of the vice, ignorance, and prejudice, which naturally cleave to them.*

Among all the various authors who have treated on this ſubject, none have carried off a larger portion of fame, than that celebrated *French* moraliſt the duke of *Rochefoucault*, who

who has always been ranked by many as the greateſt, and unanimouſly acquired the precedency as a moral writer, and who has been thought to dive deeper into the human heart, than any of his predeceſſors; though with what truth or propriety this unlimited merit is beſtowed, I own, I am a ſtranger to, and cannot give my opinion, according to the honeſt ſentiments of my heart, without condemning the approbation and univerſal applauſe beſtowed on him by the world: and I am ſo far from thinking his knowledge of mankind founded on right principles, that, notwithſtanding I condemn him for his uncharitable manner of judging, as unbecoming both a man and a Chriſtian, yet, ſtill I cannot help pitying the unhappineſs of his choice or fate, be it which it will,

that muſt certainly have condemned him in purſuit of his ſtudies, to men not only of the loweſt but moſt infamous of the human race; and a ſtranger to thoſe many noble and generous ſentiments, that often ſhine forth in a mind conſcious of its own integrity, and actuated alone by the true principles of *honour*, *virtue*, and *religion*.

However he may have laid himſelf open to the ſevereſt cenſure, yet I would do him the juſtice not to derogate from his real merit; and I muſt ſay, notwithſtanding all his faults and unhappy prejudices, he has undoubtedly many beauties, and has diſcovered here and there, in ſeveral places throughout his writings, a maſterly genius, an inimitable ſagacity, and an univerſal knowledge: and had he not been ſo general and ſatyrical, in many

ny of his reflections, he would have made a moſt admirable and uſeful author. But, upon the whole, I cannot help condemning his maxims as erroneous, and what may prove of very pernicious conſequence to thoſe, whoſe minds are weak or young, and quite uninſtructed in the knowledge of good and evil; eſpecially as there generally is too ſtrong a propenſity to the latter, and the firſt ideas ſeldom fail of taking root and making a long and laſting impreſſion; or, to make uſe of Mr. *Pope*'s expreſſion,

Juſt as the twig is bent, the tree inclines.

Our moral author, *Rochefoucault*, conſiders man made up altogether of *pride* and *ſelf-love*, and that every individual action, however ſeemingly laudable in itſelf, takes its riſe, if you will

will trace it up to its original ſpring, from one or both of theſe motives; and goes ſo far I think, if I underſtand the ſenſe of his words, as to ſtrip mankind of every amiable qualification, till they have not one ſingle virtue left among them. For example, what can be more ill-natured, than to ſuppoſe there is either truth or propriety in the diſagreeable aſſertions contained in the following maxims, which preſented themſelves to my view on accidentally opening the book; and you will find hundreds more, in ſhort, to the ſame effect.

CLXXIII.

We are ſo ſtrongly poſſeſt with a good opinion of ourſelves, that we take thoſe things for virtues, which are no other than vices, that look like them, and ſuch

ſuch as the love of ourſelves impoſes upon us.

CCXIV.

The love of reputation, the fear of ſhame, the deſign of promoting an intereſt, the deſire of making life eaſy and convenient, and a longing to pull down ſomebody above us, are moſt commonly the cauſe of that valour ſo much cried up in the world.

Nor does he uſe his women a jot better: for inſtance,

CCVI.

Womens virtue is frequently nothing but a regard for their own quiet, and a tenderneſs for their reputation.

CCLXVII.

The generality of honeſt women, are like hid treaſures, which are ſafe, only becauſe nobody hath ſought after them.

My

My Lord *Shaftſbury*, in his treatiſe entitled, *Senſus Communis*, an eſſay on the freedom of *wit* and *humour*, in the following paſſage ſeems to have had an eye to the duke of *Rochefoucault*, where he cenſures this kind of wit in general, and theſe maxims in particular.

They would ſo explain (ſays he) *all the ſocial paſſions and natural affections, as to denominate them of the ſelfiſh kind; thus civility, hoſpitality, humanity towards ſtrangers, or people in diſtreſs, is only a more deliberate ſelfiſhneſs. An honeſt heart is only a more cunning one; and honeſty and good-nature, a more deliberate or better regulated ſelf-love. The love of children, kindred, and poſterity, is purely love of ſelf. And thus love of one's country, and love of mankind, muſt alſo be ſelf-love!*

Nor

Nor is this all, for a little further his lordſhip proceeds, and ſays:

Magnanimity and courage, no doubt, are modifications of this univerſal ſelf-love. They are a ſort of retailers and diſtributors of this wit, who have run changes, and diviſions without end, upon this article of ſelf-love; you have the ſame thought ſpun out a hundred ways, and drawn into motto's and maxims, that act as diſintereſtedly, or generouſly, as you pleaſe, ſelf is ſtill at the bottom, and nothing elſe. Now, if theſe gentlemen who delight ſo much in the play of words, but are cautious how they grapple cloſely with definitions, would tell us only, what ſelf-intereſt was, and determine happineſs and good; there would be an end of this ænigmatical wit. For in this we ſhould agree, that happineſs was to be purſued, and in fact

fact was always ſought after; but, whether found in following nature, and giving way to common affection; or in ſuppreſſing it, and turning every paſſion towards private advantage, a narrow ſelf-end, or the preſervation of mere life; this would be the matter in debate between us: the queſtion would not be, Who loved himſelf, or who not, but who loved himſelf the righteſt, and after the beſt manner. 'Tis the height of wiſdom, no doubt, to be rightly ſelfiſh; and to value life, as far as life is good, belongs to diſcretion. But a wretched life is no wiſe man's wiſh. To be without honeſty, is in effect to be without natural affection, or ſociableneſs, of any kind. And a life without natural affection, friendſhip, or ſociableneſs, would be found a wretched one, were it to be tried. 'Tis as theſe feelings and affections are intrinſically valuable and worthy,

worthy, that ſelf-intereſt is to be rated and eſteemed. A man is by nothing ſo much himſelf, as by the temper and character of his paſſions and affections; if he loſes what is manly and worthy in theſe, he is as much loſt to himſelf as when he loſes his memory and underſtanding. If life be not a dear thing indeed, he who has refuſed to live a villain, and has preferred death to a baſe action, has been a gainer by the bargain.

So much for the earl of *Shaftſbury*, and though it muſt, I think, be confeſs'd, he has ſpoke with great juſtice and propriety, yet had I made ſo long a quotation, from an author of leſs eminence, it would have needed ſome little apology. But to purſue my ſubject.

Not to allow mankind any one ſingle virtue, and take from him the merit of any action however laudable it may

may appear to be, is as abſurd and unjuſt, as if I ſhould take upon me to aſſert, that human nature was capable of abſolute perfection, which is a contradiction and inconſiſtency no man, in his ſenſes, I think, would endeavour to ſupport. We have undoubtedly our virtues and our vices interwoven with our conſtitutions, and as our paſſions are more or leſs predominant, or in ſubjection to our reaſon, ſo our good or bad diſpoſitions are more or leſs conſpicuous, and he is the beſt man that is freeſt from vice, and tempers the heat of his paſſions with reaſon and reflection. For my part I am contented to ſay with the poet,

* —*Si vitiis mediocribus, ac mea paucis*
Mendoſa eſt natura, alioqui recta, velut ſi
Egregio inſperſos reprêndas corpore nævos.

As to enjoy an uninterrupted felicity,

* Horat. Lib. I. Sat. vi.

city, is not only inconſiſtent with our frail exiſtence, but repugnant to the deſign of our wiſe Creator; ſo we are ſenſible it is altogether impoſſible to diveſt ourſelves entirely of all thoſe frailties and prejudices ſo inſeparably connected with the nature of our conſtitution, and the unalterable portion of humanity: yet barely to ſuppoſe, that he who knows our foibles and imperfections, together with the weakneſs of our nature, has not given us ſome virtues proportionably ſufficient to balance the ſcale, is a meanneſs in ourſelves, and the higheſt ingratitude to the noble Author of our being.

I freely acknowledge, and daily experience convinces me of the truth, that hypocriſy is a vice too general among mankind; and many actions, which carry the external appearance of great and laudable, could their

original motive be diſcovered, would be found perhaps to proceed from *ſelf-intereſt*, or *ambition*, or both, and our liberality to the diſtreſſed and indigent, are too often the effects of *pride* and *oſtentation*, rather than any real *charity*; but the ſecret ſprings of action, which influence the heart of man, is a knowledge reſerved to Him only from whom no ſecrets are hid.

Yet, notwithſtanding, allowing all this to be true, I ſhall conclude by obſerving, it is a moſt cruel and uncharitable manner of proceeding to condemn all mankind for the degeneracy of a few, whoſe minds are ſo vitiated by an habitual courſe of vice and immorality, that they are inſenſibly deaf to the voice of reaſon, and thoſe powerful charms of virtue and religion; and I deſire to live no longer, than while I am convinced, there are many

many men in the world of an innate worth and honour, whoſe whole lives are governed by the ſtricteſt principles of *Truth* and *Chriſtianity*, and are far from being incapable of acting conſiſtent with ſuch principles upon every occaſion, and with no other view or motive than that of acting right.

This may ſuffice by way of preface; and as for the following reflections, the author (or editor, call him which you pleaſe, as he is not over-above ſollicitous for the reputation, any more than the ſucceſs of them) has little to add, than that they are the fruit of a general reading, joined to a ſeries of the ſtricteſt obſervations on the various tempers and diſpoſitions of mankind.

The numerous citations (from a variety of different authors) which will frequently occur to the reader, were

were at firſt intended merely as ſo many remarks, in order to aſſiſt the memory greatly embaraſſed by a too laborious application in ſearch after a thorough knowledge of mankind, abſtracted from the leaſt intention of their ever making a public appearance, which will ſufficiently apologize for any little orthographical incorrectneſs, the judicious reader may too frequently meet with.

It may alſo not be altogether improper, before I drop this ſubject, to obſerve, that upon peruſal of the following ſheets, there may poſſibly be found ſeveral ſentences that carry the ſame idea in their meaning, though ſomewhat differently expreſſed, yet the author hopes he ſhall ſtand excuſed from the imputation of *tautology*, as it was almoſt impoſſible to avoid it in ſuch a collection.

MORAL

MORAL
REFLECTIONS.

I.

IT is of the laſt importance, to ſeaſon the paſſions of a child with devotion, which ſeldom dies in a mind that has received an early tincture of it; tho' it may ſeem extinguiſhed for a while, by the cares of the world, the heat of youth, or the allurements of vice, it generally breaks out and diſcovers itſelf again, as ſoon as diſcretion, conſideration, age, or misfortunes, have brought the man to himſelf. The fire may be covered and over-laid, but cannot entirely be quenched and ſmothered.

II.

It is an unſpeakable advantage to poſſeſs our minds, with an habitual good intention, and to aim all our thoughts, words, and actions, at ſome laudable end, whether it be the glory of our Maker, the good of mankind, or the benefit of our own ſouls.

III.

There cannot be a greater ſlavery in this world, than to dote upon what we ought to condemn; yet this muſt be our condition, in all the parts of life, if we ſuffer ourſelves to approve any thing but what tends to the promotion of what is good and honourable.

IV.

Wiſdom, virtue, and valour, have a natural right to govern; he alone ought to command others, who has

moſt

moſt wiſdom to diſcover what is juſt; moſt virtue to adhere to it; and moſt courage to put it into execution.

V.

The truly virtuous man enjoys a mind perfectly compoſed; he has a ſecret ſpring of happineſs in his heart; his converſation is pleaſant; and his countenance ſerene: he taſtes all the innocent ſatisfactions of life pure and ſincere; he has no ſhare in pleaſures that leave a ſting behind them, nor is he cheated with that kind of mirth in the midſt of which there is heavineſs.

VI.

Seeing a man is more happy that has nothing to loſe, than he that loſeth that which he hath, we ſhould neither hope for riches, nor fear poverty.

VII.

Good-nature is more agreeable in converſation than wit; and gives a certain air to the countenance, which is more amiable than beauty. It ſhews virtue in the faireſt light, takes off in ſome meaſure from the deformity of vice, and makes even folly and impertinence ſupportable.

VIII.

In order to quicken human induſtry, Providence has ſo contrived it, that our daily food is not to be procured without much pains and labour.

IX.

When an old man bewails the loſs of ſuch gratifications which are paſſed, he diſcovers a monſtrous inclination to that which is not in the courſe of Providence to recall. The ſtate of an old

old man, who is diſſatisfied, merely for his being ſuch, is the moſt out of all meaſure of reaſon, and good ſenſe, of any being, from the higheſt angel, to the loweſt worm. How miſerable is the contemplation, to conſider a libidinous old man (while all created things, beſides himſelf and devils, are following the order of Providence) fretting at the courſe of things, and being almoſt the ſole male-content in the creation.

X.

Age in virtuous perſons of either ſex, carries in it an authority, which makes it preferable to all the pleaſures of youth.

XI.

However abſurd the love of fame may appear, it is not wholly to be diſcouraged, ſince it ſometimes pro-

duces very good effects, not only as it reſtrains us from doing any thing which is mean and contemptible, but as it often raiſes us to actions, great and glorious. The principle may be faulty, but the conſequences it produces are ſometimes ſo good, that for the benefit of mankind it ought not to be totally aboliſhed.

XII.

The enjoyment of pleaſure is not always required; the privation of pain, well-uſed, renders our condition ſufficiently happy.

XIII.

The mind never unbends itſelf ſo agreeably, as in the converſation of a well-choſen friend. There is, indeed, no bleſſing of life, that is any ways comparable to the enjoyment of a diſcreet and virtuous friend. It eaſes and unloads

unloads the mind, clears and improves the underſtanding, ingenders thoughts and knowledge, animates virtue and good reſolutions, ſooths and allays the paſſions, and finds employment for moſt of the vacant hours of life.

XIV.

Sovereignty and rank are neceſſary evils to keep the paſſions within bounds; the lower ſort ſhould be content with meriting real eſteem, by their ſimple and modeſt virtue; and the *Great* ſhould be perſuaded, that nothing but outward homage will be paid them, unleſs they have true merit. By this means, the one ſort will not be dejected with their low condition; nor the other pride themſelves too much in their grandeur; men will be ſenſible that kings are neceſſary; and kings will not forget they are but men.

XV.

XV.

So inſinuating are the pleaſures of ſympathy, and ſo widely diffuſed through our whole lives, that there is hardly ſuch a thing as ſatisfaction or contentment, of which they make not an eſſential part.

XVI.

Could we but once be brought to conſider ſeriouſly the happineſs, tranquility, and ſecurity, which attends a modeſt diſpoſition and quiet mind, fitted to every ſtation in life, ſatisfied with any reaſonable circumſtances, we ſhould be convinced of the abſurdity and ſelf-injury of immoderate deſires and conceited imaginations; of perſonal advantage in ſuch things as titles, honours, precedencies, fame, glory, or vulgar aſtoniſhment, admiration, and applauſe.

XVII.

XVII.

Juſtice is the foundation and the fence of ſociety, without it we ſhould be ſtrollers and vagabonds: our impetuoſity would ſoon reduce us to our primitive confuſion, out of which we are happily extricated: yet, inſtead of chearfully acknowledging the benefit, we find a regret to ſubmit to that happy ſubjection it keeps us in, and ſtill long after fatal liberty, which would be the unhappineſs of our lives.

XVIII.

As to be perfectly juſt is an attribute in the divine nature; to be ſo to the utmoſt of our abilities, is the glory of a man.

XIX.

Irreligious men, whoſe ſhort proſpects are filled with earth, and ſenſe, and

mortal life; are invited, by theſe mean ideas, to actions proportionably low and little: but a mind, whoſe views are enlightened and extended by religion, is animated to nobler purſuits, by more ſublime, and remote objects.

XX.

To treat men always with the utmoſt rigour they deſerve, is brutality, and not juſtice: but, on the other hand, a too extenſive good-nature, which has not force enough to puniſh evil, or to reward merit with diſtinction, is not a virtue, but a weakneſs; and frequently produces as great miſchiefs as malice itſelf.

XXI.

He is a very unhappy man, who ſets his heart upon being admired by the multitude, or affects a general

and

and undiſtinguiſhing applauſe among men. What pious men call the teſtimony of a good conſcience, ſhould be the meaſure of our ambition in this kind; that is to ſay, a man of ſpirit ſhould contemn the praiſe of the ignorant, and like being applauded for nothing, but what he knows in his own heart he deſerves.

XXII.

The jealous man lies under this particular unhappineſs, that his jealouſy naturally helps to alienate that affection which he is ſo ſolicitous to engroſs; and for theſe two reaſons, becauſe it lays too great a conſtraint on the words and actions of the ſuſpected party, and, at the ſame time, ſhews you have no honourable opinion of her; both of which are ſtrong motives to averſion.

XXIII.

XXIII.

The man who ſuffers his paſſion or reſentment to extinguiſh all natural affection, debaſes his mind, and fruſtrates, as much as in him lies, the great deſign of Providence, by ſtriking out of his nature one of the moſt divine principles implanted in it.

XXIV.

There is ſcarce any paſſion, that more excites us to every thing that is noble and generous, than a virtuous love.

XXV.

The mind that hath any caſt towards devotion, naturally flies to it in its afflictions.

XXVI.

If any child be of ſo diſingenuous a nature, as not to ſtand corrected by reproof, he, like the very worſt of ſlaves,

ſlaves, will be hardened even againſt blows themſelves.

XXVII.

A want of reſolution is one of the greateſt and moſt univerſal cauſes of all our diſquiets and unhappineſs. There is but one method of ſetting ourſelves to reſt in this particular, and that is by adhering ſtedfaſtly to one great end, as the chief and ultimate aim of all our purſuits. If we are firmly reſolved to live up to the dictates of reaſon, without any regard to wealth, reputation, or the like conſiderations, any more than as they fall in with our principal deſign, we may go through life with ſteadineſs and pleaſure: but if we will not only be virtuous, but wealthy, popular, and every thing that has a value ſet upon it by the world, we may thank our-

ourſelves for whatever miſery attends it.

XXVIII.

Whatever is oppoſite to the eternal rules of reaſon and good ſenſe, muſt be excluded from any place in the compoſition of a well-bred man.

XXIX.

The fear of death often proves mortal, and ſets people on methods to ſave their lives, which infallibly deſtroy them.

XXX.

Multiplicity of laws is as evident a token of the corruption of a ſtate, as a diverſity of medicines is of the diſtempers of the body.

XXXI.

The minds of young perſons are not gained by difficult and refined reaſonings, they muſt be inticed by agree-

agreeable and familiar images. To make truth lovely to them, it muſt be exhibited by ſenſible and beautiful repreſentations.

XXXII.

No men whatſoever can take too effectual a care to make themſelves juſt, for they have naturally too ſtrong a biaſs to the contrary way.

XXXIII.

Complaiſance renders a ſuperior amiable; an equal agreeable; and an inferior acceptable: it ſmooths diſtinctions, ſweetens converſation, produces good-nature and mutual benevolence, and makes every one in the company pleaſed with himſelf.

XXXIV.

A true friend is not born every day; it is beſt to be courteous to all, intimate with few; for though perhaps we

we may have leſs cauſe of joy, I am ſure we ſhall have leſs occaſion of ſorrow.

XXXV.

It were to be wiſhed, that all men of ſenſe would think it worth their while to reflect upon the dignity of Chriſtian virtues; it would poſſibly enlarge their ſouls into ſuch a contempt of what faſhion and prejudice have made honourable, that their duty, inclination, and honour, would tend the ſame way, and make all their lives an uniform act of religion and virtue.

XXXVI.

There is a ſort of wanton miſchievouſneſs in taking pleaſure in what is deſtructive, and is a paſſion, the ſeeds of which, inſtead of being checked, is too often encouraged in children;

ren; ſo that it is no wonder, if the effects of it are often very unfortunately felt in the world.

XXXVII.

The condition of the envious man is the moſt emphatically miſerable; he is not only incapable of rejoycing in anothers merit or ſucceſs, but lives in a world wherein all mankind are in a plot againſt his quiet, by ſtudying their own happineſs and advantage.

XXXVIII.

Friendſhip improves happineſs and abates miſery, by the doubling of our joy, and dividing of our grief.

XXXIX.

Good-nature is generally born with us; health, proſperity, and kind treatment from the world, are great cheriſhers of it, where they find it; but nothing is capable of forcing it up,

where it does not grow of itſelf. It is one of the bleſſings of a happy conſtitution, which education may improve, but not produce.

XL.

Avoid diſputes as much as poſſible: in order to appear eaſy and well-bred in converſation, you may aſſure yourſelf that it requires more wit, as well as more good humour, to improve than to contradict the notions of another: but if you are at any time obliged to enter on an argument, give your reaſons with the utmoſt coolneſs and modeſty, two things which ſcarce ever fail of making an impreſſion on the hearers.

XLI.

Nothing is ſo glorious in the eyes of mankind, and ornamental to human nature, (ſetting aſide the infinite advan-

advantages which ariſe from it) as a ſtrong maſculine piety; but enthuſiaſm and ſuperſtition, are the weakneſſes of human reaſon, that expoſe us to the ſcorn and deriſion of infidels, and ſinks us even below the beaſts that periſh.

XLII.

Thoſe whom croſs accidents of fortune have undone, are pitied by all the world, becauſe it is a misfortune the conditions of humanity ſubmits us to; but thoſe that are reduced to miſery by vain profuſion, raiſe more contempt than commiſeration; becauſe it is the iſſue of a peculiar folly, from which every man has the good conceit to think himſelf exempt.

XLIII.

There are three things I would never ſtrive for, the wall, the way,

or the uppermoſt ſeat; if I deſerve well, a low place cannot diſparage me ſo much as I ſhall grace it; if not, the height of my place ſhall add to my ſhame, whilſt every man ſhall condemn me of pride and unworthineſs.

XLIV.

He that lends his friend a weapon for his revenge, makes himſelf a partaker of his crime.

XLV.

There is no true felicity without virtue.

XLVI.

There is I know not what heroiacal in great liberality, as well as in great valour; and there is a great analogy between thoſe two virtues; the one raiſes the ſoul above the conſideration of wealth, and the other beyond the management and deſire of life. But with

with all theſe gay and generous motives, without good conduct, the one becomes ruinous, and the other fatal.

XLVII.

He that is ſatisfied with what he has, wants nothing.

XLVIII.

There is ſomething of a virtue in good reſolutions, though the frailty of our nature is ſuch perhaps that we have not power to purſue them.

XLIX.

Fulneſs is the parent of diſeaſes, as idleneſs is of vice.

L.

Some men are never eaſy, others are always ſo, and both may be in fault.

LI.

By making the thoughts of death familiar to us, it greatly helps to

take off that terrible appearance in which it is viewed by vulgar minds.

LII.

Our happineſs in this world proceeds from the ſuppreſſion of our deſires; but in the next world from the gratification of them.

LIII.

No man finds poverty a trouble, but he that makes it ſo: do but compare the looks of the rich and the poor, and you will find the poor man to have a ſmoother brow, and to be more merry at heart; or if any trouble befals him, it paſſes over like a cloud; whereas the other, either his good humour is counterfeit, or his melancholly deep and ulcerated, and the worſe, becauſe he dares not publickly own his misfortunes, but he is forced to play the part of a happy man,

man, even with a cancer in his heart. His felicity is but perſonated, and if he were but ſtripped of his ornaments, he would be contemptible.

LIV.

It is a ſecret averſion to juſtice, that makes us fonder of giving than returning, of obliging than acknowledging: thus we ſee, the moſt liberal, generous men, are not uſually the moſt juſt. Juſtice includes a regularity that bridles them, as being founded on a conſtant method of reaſon, oppoſed to thoſe natural impulſes which are the hinges upon which liberality almoſt always moves.

LV.

It is ridiculous for a poor man to preach the contempt of riches, or for a rich man to extol the benefits of poverty; when neither knows how

he ſhould behave in the contrary condition.

LVI.

It is a nice point to check the ſeeds of anger in children, ſo as not to take off the edge of their ſpirit; to avoid which, the greateſt care muſt be taken between liberty and ſeverity, that they be not too much emboldened or depreſſed; ſo that, when to uſe the bit, and when the ſpur, is the main difficulty.

LVII.

Never let a child be put to the neceſſity of begging any thing baſely; enure him to familiarity where he has any emulation; and, in all his exerciſes, let him underſtand, 'tis generous to overcome his adverſary, but not to hurt him.

LVIII.

Allow a child to be pleaſed when he

he does well, but not tranſported, for that will puff him up into too high a conceit of himſelf: give him nothing that he cries for till the fit is over, but then let him have it when he is quiet, to ſhew that there is nothing to be got by being peeviſh: chide him for whatever he does amiſs, and make him betimes acquainted with the fortune he was born to, taking particular care of avoiding temptations that he cannot reſiſt, and provocations that he cannot bear.

LIX.

Never condemn a friend unheard, or without letting him know his accuſer or his crime.

LX.

Man, conſidered in himſelf, is a very helpleſs and a very wretched being; he is ſubject every moment to the

the greateſt calamities and misfortunes: he is beſet with dangers on all ſides, and may become unhappy by numberleſs caſualties which he could not foreſee, nor prevented had he foreſeen them.

LXI.

He who jeſts upon a man that is drunk, injures the abſent.

LXII.

A prude often preſerves her reputation, when ſhe has loſt her virtue.

LXIII.

We ſee a little, preſume a great deal, and ſo jump to the concluſion.

LXIV.

Though nothing ſo much gains upon the affections as extempore eloquence, which we have conſtantly occaſion for, and are obliged to practiſe every day, yet we very rarely meet with any one who excells in it.

LXV.

LXV.

Raillery is no longer agreeable, than while no one in the company is diſpleaſed with it.

LXVI.

Men ought to form their judgment of things unexperienced, from what they have experienced.

LXVII.

He is the true poſſeſſor of a thing who enjoys it, and not he that owns it without the enjoyment of it.

LXVIII.

Great griefs are but ſhort, and thoſe of long continuance are but ſmall.

LXIX.

It is worſe to a good mind to do, than to ſuffer injury; and that man prejudices himſelf more when he hurts another, than he would be injured if he were the ſufferer.

LXX.

LXX.

Riches, and every external good, without virtue, are fruitleſs and unprofitable enjoyments.

LXXI.

That praiſe is vain, which a man heaps upon himſelf to provoke others alſo to praiſe him; and is chiefly contemptible, as proceeding from an importunate and unſeaſonable affectation of eſteem.

LXXII.

Few men have done more harm than thoſe who have been thought to be able to do leaſt; and there cannot be a greater error, than to believe a man whom we ſee qualified with too mean parts to do good, to be therefore incapable of doing hurt. There is a ſupply of malice, of pride, of induſtry, and even of folly, in the weakeſt, when he

he ſets his heart upon it, that makes a ſtrange progreſs in miſchief.

LXXIII.

'Tis the common vice of nature, that we repoſe moſt confidence, and receive the greateſt apprehenſions from things unſeen, concealed, and unknown.

LXXIV.

Whoever expects puniſhment, already ſuffers it; and whoever deſerves it, expects it.

LXXV.

We are more ſollicitous that men ſpeak of us, then how they ſpeak; and 'tis enough for us, that our names are often mentioned, be it after what manner it will.

LXXVI.

All vices are leſs dangerous when open to be ſeen, and thoſe moſt pernicious that lurk under a diſſembled temper.

LXXVII.

LXXVII.

Truth is the moſt powerful thing in the world, ſince even fiction itſelf muſt be governed by it, and can only pleaſe by its reſemblance.

LXXVIII.

There is a kind of, I know not what, congratulation in well-doing, that gives an inward ſatisfaction, and a certain generous boldneſs, that accompanies a good conſcience. A ſoul, daringly vicious, may poſſibly arm itſelf with ſecurity, but cannot ſupply itſelf with this complacency and ſatisfaction.

LXXIX.

Women ſhould ſtudy juſt ſo much of philoſophy, that, from the moral part, they may learn to ſelect ſuch inſtructions as will teach them to judge of mens humours, to defend themſelves

ſelves from their treacheries, to regulate the ardour of their own deſires, to manage their liberty right, improve the innocent pleaſures of life, and mildly to bear the inconſtancy of a ſervant, the rudeneſs of a huſband, and the importunity of years, wrinkles, and ſuch unavoidable accidents.

LXXX.

Baſhfulneſs was conſidered by the antients, as an ornament to youth, but a reproach to old age.

LXXXI.

To form a truly happy marriage, a mutual conjunction of love and friendſhip is required, which generally produces a ſweet ſociety, full of conſtancy, truth, and an infinite number of uſeful and ſolid obligations; and if well formed and rightly taken, 'tis the beſt of all human ſocieties, and that

ſo

ſo few are obſerved to be happy, is a token of its value and eſtimation.

LXXXII.

The melancholly way in which we have been taught religion, makes us unapt to think of it in good humour. 'Tis in adverſity chiefly, or in ill health, under affliction, or diſturbance of mind, or diſcompoſure of temper, that we have recourſe to it.

LXXXIII.

Whoever was to make an heap of ills together, there is no one who would not rather chooſe to bear away the ills he has, than to come to an equal diviſion with all other men from that heap, and take with him from thence ſo much as would, upon dividing, fall to his particular ſhare.

LXXXIV.

'Twas a ſaying of old, that the uſe of

of a friend is more pleaſing and neceſſary than the elements of fire and water.

LXXXV.

The common fears of the world are wrong and ill placed. No man fears to do ill; every man to ſuffer ill: wherein, if we conſider it well, we ſhall find that we fear our beſt friends. A man learns more in one week's extremity, than a whole life of proſperity could teach him: and in reaſon, and common experience, proſperity uſually makes us forget our death; adverſity, on the other hand, makes us neglect our life. Now (if we meaſure both of theſe by their effects) forgetfulneſs of death makes us ſecure: neglect of this life makes us careful of a better. So much therefore as neglect of life, is better than forgetfulneſs of death; and watchfulneſs, better than

ſecurity; ſo much more beneficial ſhould we eſteem adverſity than proſperity.

LXXXVI.

There are more calamities in the world ariſing from love than from hatred.

LXXXVII.

Love is the daughter of idleneſs, but the mother of diſquietude.

LXXXVIII.

The cuſtom of the world, is to hate things preſent, to deſire future, and to magnify what is paſt: on the contrary, we ſhould rather eſteem that which is preſent beſt; for, both what is paſt, was once preſent; and what is future, will be preſent: future things next, becauſe they are preſent in hope; what is paſt, the leaſt of all.

LXXXIX.

A modeſt man preſerves his character,

racter, as a frugal man does his fortune; if either of them live up to the heighth, one will find loſſes, the other errors, which he has not ſtock by him to make up. It is therefore a juſt rule, to keep your deſires, your words, and actions, within the regard you obſerve your friends have for you; and never, if it were in a man's power, to take as much as poſſibly he might, either in preferment or reputation.

XC.

It is a frivilous pleaſure to be the admiration of gaping crowds; but to have the approbation of a good man in the cool reflections of his cloſet, is a gratification worthy an heroic ſpirit. The applauſe of the crowd makes the head giddy, but the atteſtation of a reaſonable man makes the heart glad.

XCI.

Complaiſance is a virtue that blends all orders of men together in a friendly intercourſe of words and actions, and is ſuited to that equality in human nature, which every one ought to conſider, ſo far as is conſiſtent with the order and œconomy of the world.

XCII.

There is no profeſſion or ſcience whatever that enobleth and enlargeth the mind, equal to religion and philoſophy. For the mind of man ſeems to adapt itſelf to the different nature of its objects; it is contracted and debaſed in being converſant in little and low things, and feels a proportionable enlargement ariſing from the contemplation of great and ſublime ideas.

XCIII.

To compleat a thorough education, it

it may be neceſſary to viſit the court; if, for no other reaſon, than to ſtudy a certain turn of thought, and air of behaviour, not to be learned elſewhere.

XCIV.

A man need not care for more knowledge than to know himſelf: he needs no more pleaſure than to content himſelf; no more victory than to overcome himſelf; no more riches than to enjoy himſelf: and all other knowledge is ridiculous, while he is a ſtranger to himſelf.

XCV.

An inconſtant and wavering mind, as it makes a man unfit for ſociety; ſo, beſides, it makes him ridiculous, and hinders him from ever attaining any perfection in himſelf; and the mind, while it would be every thing, proves nothing.

XCVI.

Men of grave natures are the moſt conſtant; for the ſame reaſon, men ſhould be more conſtant than women.

XCVII.

The loweſt reptiles are as dangerous, and as dreadful, as the fierceſt beaſt; for the poiſon of a toad, or the tooth of a ſnake, will deſtroy as ſure as the claws of a wolf or a tyger.

XCVIII.

We ſhould never do that to another, which we would not expect, or even wiſh, they would do to us.

XCIX.

He that is perfectly wiſe, is perfectly happy.

C.

There are two things, which if we would but always bear in mind, I ſhould think were ſufficient to prevent

vent us from doing ill; that the whole world are our brethren, and that there is one above who ſees every action of our lives.

CI.

Preſerve your own liberties, and never infringe upon your neighbours.

CII.

He that is grateful to another thro' intereſt, or fear only; is like a woman that is honeſt, on account of her reputation.

CIII.

After a friendſhip is once cemented, all ſuſpicions are unpardonable and unjuſt, and deſtroy the very eſſence of friendſhip.

CIV.

He who underſtands not to hold his peace, will never know how to ſpeak.

CV.

Death is feared and ſhunned by the wicked, as a rock which they are every moment of their lives in the utmoſt anxieties to avoid; but, to the good man, it is viewed with a pleaſing aſpect, as the harbour of peace and eternal happineſs, which he ſoon hopes to arrive at.

CVI.

Death is as much a debt as money, and we ſhould be as willing and ready to pay the one as the other.

CVII.

As anger is one of the moſt deteſtable of all vices, ſo it is the moſt unjuſtifiable: for to contend with our ſuperiors is folly and madneſs; with our equals it is dangerous; and with our inferiors it is an indignity.

CVIII.

The anger of women and children

is

is moſt commonly fierce, but ſoon over.

CIX.

All our endeavours after greatneſs proceed from nothing but a deſire of being ſurrounded by a multitude of perſons and affairs that may hinder us from looking into ourſelves, which is a view we cannot bear.

CX.

If we fear all things that are poſſible, we live without any bounds to our miſery.

CXI.

True happineſs is confined to no place, but is always to be found in a contented mind.

CXII.

The ſenſe of honour is of ſo delicate a nature, that it is only to be met with in minds that are naturally noble,

ble, or in ſuch as have been cultivated by great examples, or a refined education.

CXIII.

True honour, though it be a different principle from religion, is that which produces the ſame effects. The religious man fears, the man of honour ſcorns, to do an ill action. The one conſiders vice as ſomething unbecoming; the other, as what is forbidden. The lines of action, though drawn from different parts, terminate in the ſame point.

CXIV.

There are few, even of the worſt of mankind, who have not ſomething of virtue, though an imperfect ſenſe: nothing therefore is more juſt, than that old maxim, That it is as hard to find a man wholly ill, as altogether good.

CXV.

CXV.

Virtue is defined, to conſiſt in a certain juſt diſpoſition, or proportionable affection, of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong.

CXVI.

True virtue cannot ſubſiſt without piety; for where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the ſame benignity, firmneſs, or conſtancy, the ſame good compoſure of the affections, or uniformity of the mind.

CXVII.

As the pleaſures of the mind to an intelligent being, are ſuperior to thoſe of the body; whatever therefore can create a conſtant ſeries or train of mental happineſs, is more conſiderable to his felicity than thoſe which create to him a like conſtant courſe or train of ſenſual enjoyments.

CXVIII.

CXVIII.

'Tis allowed, that to have the natural affections, ſuch as are founded on love and good-will, is to have the chief means and power of ſelf-enjoyment; and that to want them, is certain miſery and ill.

CXIX.

The greateſt of fools is he who impoſes on himſelf; and, in his greateſt concerns, thinks certainly he knows that which he has leaſt ſtudied, and of which he is wholly ignorant.

CXX.

Princes ſometimes hurt themſelves by different faults, either by ſuffering themſelves to be often deceived by flattering favourites, or the misfortune of never having a true friend.

CXXI.

We often ſee, that great cities and mag-

magnificent courts ſerve too much to corrupt the manners and ſentiments of mankind; and that, by uniting a multitude of men in the ſame place, they often do but unite and multiply their paſſions.

CXXII.

Wit often proves of pernicious conſequence, when it ceaſes to be tempered with virtue and humanity.

CXXIII.

True fortitude is indeed ſo becoming in human nature, that he who wants it, ſcarce deſerves the name of a man: but we find ſeveral, who ſo much abuſe this notion, that they place the whole of honour and fortitude in a kind of brutal courage; by which means we have had many among us, who have called themſelves men of honour and courage, that would

would have been a diſgrace to a gibbet.

CXXIV.

The man who ſacrifices any duty of a reaſonable creature, to a prevailing mode or faſhion; who looks upon any thing as honourable, that is diſpleaſing to his Maker, or deſtructive to ſociety; who thinks himſelf obliged, by this principle, to the practice of ſome virtues and not of others, is by no means to be reckoned among true men of honour.

CXXV.

A good conſcience is to the ſoul what health is to the body; it preſerves a conſtant eaſe and ſerenity within us, and more than countervails all the calamities and afflictions which can poſſibly befal us, and is the beſt ſupport under the greateſt trials and difficulties of life.

CXXVI.

CXXVI.

There is a juſt and eaſy difference to be put betwixt a friend and an enemy, betwixt a familiar and a friend; and much good uſe to be made of all, provided it be done with diſcretion. I will not diſcloſe myſelf at all to my enemy, ſomewhat to my friend, wholly to no man, leſt I ſhould be more others than my own; and how do I know whether he that loves me now, may not hate me hereafter.

CXXVII.

True virtue reſts in the conſciouſneſs of itſelf, either for reward or cenſure; if, therefore, I know myſelf upright, falſe rumours ſhall not daunt me; if not anſwerable to the good report of my friends, I will myſelf find the firſt fault, that I may prevent the ſhame of others.

CXXVIII.

CXXVIII.

There never was any man ſo inſenſible not to perceive a Deity throughout the ordinary courſe of nature, tho' many have been ſo obſtinately ungrateful as not to confeſs it.

CXXIX.

It is a common thing for men to hate thoſe that were the cauſe of their preferment, becauſe they were no ſtrangers to their mean original.

CXXX.

All our ingratitude does not prevent Providence from ſending us every thing that is needful, even though, at the ſame time, we queſtion the hand from whence they come.

CXXXI.

He that looks to the preſent, and does not forget what is paſt, can never be ungrateful.

CXXXII.

CXXXII.

True gratitude conſiſts in being always willing and ready, ſeeking every occaſion to requite a benefit; for, though he cannot compaſs his end, yet he does more than the man, who without any endeavour, returns it perhaps immediately.

CXXXIII.

We had almoſt better be deceived by ſome, than to ſuſpect all.

CXXXIV.

As ingratitude is a crime againſt which the law has provided no remedy, ſo it is the moſt deteſtable in others, as well as unpardonable in ourſelves.

CXXXV.

A good man is happy within himſelf, and independent upon fortune; kind to his friend; temperate to his enemy; religiouſly juſt; indefatigably

laborious; and diſcharges every duty with a conſtancy and congruity of actions.

CXXXVI.

Wiſdom and virtue are two infallible ſpecificks againſt all the croſſes and accidents of human life.

CXXXVII.

Hope and fear are the ſource of moſt of our misfortunes.

CXXXVIII.

There is no misfortune or unhappineſs to which philoſophy and virtue is not an antidote.

CXXXIX.

Vice (like many diſeaſes of the body) is epidemic, and one bad man often infects another.

CXL.

No man is worth more than he enjoys.

CXLI.

CXLI.

Misfortunes, however unavoidable in themſelves, may be palliated by wiſdom and philoſophy.

CXLII.

Flattery often proves one of the worſt of enemies concealed; and betrays us inſenſibly.

CXLIII.

A ſenſible man needs no advice, and a fool won't obſerve it.

CXLIV.

He, who is not a friend to himſelf, is a friend to nobody.

CXLV.

Expectation in a weak mind, makes an evil greater, and a good leſs; but, in a reſolved mind, it digeſts an evil before it comes, and makes a future good long before preſent. I will expect the worſt, becauſe it may come; the beſt, becauſe I know it will come.

CXLVI.

I ſee there is no man ſo happy, as to have all things; and no man ſo miſerable, as not to have ſome: why ſhould I look for a better condition than all others? If I have ſomewhat, and that of the beſt things, I will thankfully enjoy them, and want the reſt with contentment.

CXLVII.

I will not care what I have, whether much or little; if little, my account will be leſs; if more, I ſhall do the more good, and receive the more glory.

CXLVIII.

It was a remark of a certain author, who is thought to have dived into the human heart, and the nature of the paſſions, deeper than moſt men, That the moſt extravagant love comes neareſt to the ſtrongeſt hatred.

CXLIX.

CXLIX.

Providence hath, with a bountiful hand, prepared variety of pleaſures for the various ſtages of life. It behoves us, not to be wanting to ourſelves in forwarding the intention of nature, by the culture of our minds, and a due preparation of each faculty for the enjoyment of thoſe objects it is capable of being affected with.

CL.

Let my eſtate be ever ſo mean, I will always keep myſelf rather beneath than above it; a man may riſe when he will with honour, but cannot fall without ſhame.

CLI.

Grief for things paſt that cannot be remedied, and care for things to come that cannot be prevented, may eaſily hurt, but can benefit no one: we

ſhould therefore truſt to Providence in both, and enjoy the preſent.

CLII.

It is a vain-glorious flattery for a man to praiſe himſelf; and an envious wrong to detract from others; we ſhould therefore be cautious and circumſpect, in ſpeaking ill of others, or good of ourſelves.

CLIII.

Human life is very juſtly compared to the ſtage, and it is of no conſequence, whether we act the prince or the beggar, the whole buſineſs is to act our part well.

CLIV.

To do good and great actions, merely to gain reputation, and tranſmit a name to poſterity, is a vicious appetite, and will certainly enſnare the perſon who is moved by it, on ſome occaſions,

ſions, into a falſe delicacy, for fear of reproach; and at others, into artifices which taint his mind, though they may enlarge his fame.

CLV.

Knowledge is that, which next to virtue, truly and eſſentially raiſes one man above another; it furniſhes one half of the human ſoul. It makes a being pleaſant to us, fills the mind with entertaining views, and adminiſters to it a perpetual ſeries of gratification. It gives eaſe to ſolitude, and gracefulneſs to retirement: it fills a public ſtation with ſuitable abilities, and adds a luſtre to thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of them.

CLVI.

Pride, in a woman, deſtroys all ſymmetry and grace; and affectation is a more terrible enemy to a fine face, than the ſmall-pox.

CLVII.

Of all wild beaſts a tyrant is the worſt; and of all tame beaſts a flatterer.

CLVIII.

Vice hath its certain period, after which it becomes deſperate and incurable.

CLIX.

Nothing is more ſilly, than the pleaſure ſome people take in what they call ſpeaking their minds. A man of this make will ſay a rude thing for the mere pleaſure of ſaying it; when an oppoſite behaviour, full as innocent, might have preſerved his friend, or made his fortune.

CLX.

That man, who wholly gives himſelf up to luſt, will ſoon find it the leaſt fault he is guilty of.

CLXI.

CLXI.

The gay part of mankind are moſt amorous, the ſerious moſt loving.

CLXII.

A coquet often loſes her reputation, while ſhe preſerves her virtue.

CLXIII.

Content is natural wealth, and luxury an artificial poverty.

CLXIV.

No man has ſo much care, as he who endeavours after the moſt happineſs.

CLXV.

The ambitious and the covetous, are madmen to all intents and purpoſes, as much as thoſe who are ſhut up in dark rooms; but they have the good luck to have numbers on their ſide; whereas the frenzy of one who is given up for a lunatic, is more ſingular in its kind, and does not fall in with the madneſs of a multitude.

CLXVI.

CLXVI.

It is our comfort, while we are obnoxious to ſo many accidents, that we are under the care of One who directs contingencies, and has in his hands the management of every thing that is capable of annoying or offending us; who knows the aſſiſtance we ſtand in need of, and is always ready to beſtow it on thoſe who aſk it of him.

CLXVII.

Cuſtom makes many things eaſy, which at firſt ſeemed intolerable.

CLXVIII.

A good conſcience is a heaven within itſelf, and oftner the portion of the peaſant than the monarch.

CLXIX.

Religious ſtudies give us an indifference for this life, in proportion to the progreſs we make in purſuit of a better.

CLXX.

CLXX.

There are few men more miſerable, than many of thoſe which the common people eſteem happy.

CLXXI.

There is nothing ſo effectually raiſes a man's fortune as complaiſance, which recommends more to the favour of the great, than wit, or knowledge, or any other talent whatever.

CLXXII.

A good man can never be miſerable, nor a wicked man happy.

CLXXIII.

As wiſdom and virtue are the proper qualifications in the maſter of a houſe; if he is not accompliſhed in both of them, it is much better that he ſhould be deficient in the former than the latter; ſince the conſequences of vice are of an infinitely more dan-

dangerous a nature than thoſe of folly.

CLXXIV.

Were the two ſenſations of virtue and vice to be compared, for example; That of a virtuous courſe in one who lives a natural and regular life; and that of a vicious courſe in one who lives a diſſolute and debauched life; there is, I think, no queſtion but judgment would be given in favour of the former, (without any regard to conſequences) only with reſpect to the very pleaſure of ſenſe itſelf.

CLXXV.

'Tis perhaps exacting too much from youth, to require that they ſhould be inſenſible of love, as it often happens, that nothing but a well-placed love can be a ſecurity againſt dangerous and criminal paſſions.

CLXXVI.

To conſent to things which are, in them-

themſelves, ill or immoral, is a breach of duty, and leads to the greateſt miſchief: on the contrary, every thing which is an improvement of virtue, or an eſtabliſhment of right affection and integrity, is an advancement of our felicity, and opens a way to the greateſt and moſt ſolid happineſs and enjoyment.

CLXXVII.

There is a paſſion reigning in ſome men, which ſhews itſelf in a kind of hatred of mankind and ſociety, and is chiefly found in thoſe who have long indulged themſelves in an habitual moroſeneſs; or who, by dint of ill-nature, or ill-breeding, have contracted ſuch a reverſe of affability and good manners, that the ſight of mankind is diſagreeable to them. A man of this diſpoſition ſhould be ſhunned as a peſtilence, as he is the immediate oppoſite

poſite to that noble affection, which in ancient language was termed hoſpitality, or an extenſive love to mankind in general.

CLXXVIII.

Ranks and dignities are but the ſhadow of real grandeur: the external reſpect and homage which is paid to them, is likewiſe but the ſhadow of that eſteem which belongs to virtue alone. Is it not an inſtance of great wiſdom in the firſt law-givers, to have preſerved order in ſociety, by eſtabliſhing ſuch regulations, as thoſe, who have only the ſhadow of virtue, are ſatisfied with the ſhadow of eſteem?

CLXXIX.

All the members of the ſame commonwealth ought to feel and compaſſionate the miſeries of one another, as parts of the ſame body.

CLXXX.

CLXXX.

There is nothing that more betrays a baſe ungenerous ſpirit than giving of ſecret ſtabs to a man's reputation. Lampoons and ſatires, that are written with wit and ſpirit, are like poiſoned darts, which not only inflict a wound, but make it incurable.

CLXXXI.

A ſtate of temperance, ſobriety, and juſtice, without devotion, is a cold, lifeleſs, inſipid condition of virtue, and is rather to be ſtiled philoſophy than religion. Devotion opens the mind to great conceptions, and fills it with more ſublime ideas, than any that are to be met with in the moſt exalted ſcience; and, at the ſame time, warms and agitates the ſoul more than ſenſual pleaſures.

CLXXXII.

A man ſhould uſe his friends as *Moſes*

Moſes did his rod; while it was a rod he held it familiarly in his hand; when once a ſerpent, he ran away from it.

CLXXXIII.

Every man has his portion of ſorrow, be it more or leſs; and there never was the man yet, who complained not of ſomething. Before ſorrow come I will prepare for it; when it comes I will welcome it; when it goes I will not bid it farewel, ſtill expecting its return.

CLXXXIV.

We find, that all worldly things require much time in procuring, and afford but a ſhort pleaſure in the enjoyment: we ſhould not care much for what we have, nor any thing for what we have not.

CLXXXV.

'Twas a very juſt obſervation of a cele-

celebrated ancient author, that the ſons of princes learned nothing right, but to ride the great horſe; by reaſon, that in all their exerciſes, every one binds and yields to them; but a horſe, that is neither a courtier or a flatterer, throws the ſon of a king with no more remorſe than he would do that of a porter.

CLXXXVI.

True raillery is as hard to be defined as good breeding; none can underſtand the ſpeculation but thoſe who practiſe it; yet every one thinks himſelf well-bred; and the formaleſt pedant imagines he can railly with a good grace and humour.

CLXXXVII.

As vicious ſouls are ſometimes incited, by ſome ſtrange impulſe, to do well, ſo are virtuous ones to do ill.

CLXXXVIII.

Diſcourſe of a man's ſelf uſually proceeds from ſelf-love, which is its harbour, and is there obſerved to lie wait even in thoſe who are vulgarly thought to be free from ambition: therefore, as it is one of the rules of health to avoid dangerous and unwholſome places, or being in them to take the greateſt care; ſo it ought to be a like rule, concerning converſe and ſpeaking of one's-ſelf; for this kind of talk has ſlippery occaſions into which we unawares, and indiſcernably, are apt to fall.

CLXXXIX.

A man may equally affront the company he is in, by engroſſing all the talk; or obſerving a contemptuous ſilence.

CXC.

It is *not* impoſſible for a man to form

form himſelf as exquiſite a pleaſure in complying with the humour and ſentiments of others, as in bringing others over to his own; ſince 'tis the certain ſign of a ſuperior genius, that can take and become whatever dreſs it pleaſes.

CXCI.

Women are frightened at the name of argument, and are ſooner convinced by an happy turn, or witty expreſſion, than by demonſtration.

CXCII.

Whenever you commend, add your reaſons for ſo doing; it is this which diſtinguiſhes the approbation of a man of ſenſe, from the flattery of ſycophants, and admiration of fools.

CXCIII.

In arriving at the art of pleaſing in converſation, it muſt be obſerved, there is ſomething which can never be learn-

ed but in the company of the polite: the virtues of men are catching, as well as their vices; and your own obſervations will ſoon diſcover, what it is that commands attention in one man, and makes you tired and diſpleaſed with the diſcourſe of another.

CXCIV.

Very often the things we fear moſt, are better than thoſe we pray for.

CXCV.

True happineſs is that which proceeds from a ſerenity of mind; to know our duty to God and man; to eſteem the preſent, and to reſt ourſelves contented, without any anxiety for the future.

CXCVI.

Philoſophy brings us tranquility of mind, by fearing nothing; and riches, by coveting nothing.

CXCVII.

CXCVII.

It is not ſufficient to acknowledge a Supreme Being; we muſt keep his commandments.

CXCVIII.

There is no ſituation in life, that prevents a man from fulfilling his duty; if his fate be proſperous, he rejoices with humility; if bad, he overcomes it with reſolution.

CXCIX.

Every man is born with a natural impulſe to virtue, how much ſoever it may be overcome by bad company and example.

CC.

He that has overcome his luſts, has conquered one of his greateſt enemies.

CCI.

It is right policy, as well as our

duty, to be content in whatever ſtation Providence has placed us.

CCII.

True virtue ſets us above all human chances and changes, and endues us with patience and perſeverance under every circumſtance of ill, from a thorough conſciouſneſs, that he who ſends it, knows what is beſt for us.

CCIII.

It is ſufficient, when we cannot make ſome people our friends, to keep them from being our enemies.

CCIV.

All pleaſures, that are the leaſt criminal in their nature, are attended with ſome remorſe.

CCV.

He that cannot live happily any where, will live happily no where.

CCVI.

We ſhould always wiſh for the beſt; but

but prepare for the worſt that can happen.

CCVII.

If they, who labour night and day inceſſantly to heap up riches, and gain preferments and places, could but be ſenſible of the many cares, deceits, and anxieties, that are the conſequences attending the ambitious man, they would certainly rather deteſt than purſue it.

CCVIII.

Anticipating misfortunes is making ourſelves miſerable with what may never happen; and, if it ſhould, 'tis time enough then to ſuffer.

CCIX.

Even grief itſelf is pleaſant to the remembrance, when it is once paſt; as joy is, while it is preſent. We ſhould not therefore, in conceit, make ſo great difference between joy and

grief, ſince grief paſt is joyful, and long expectation of joy is grievous.

CCX.

Oftentimes thoſe things, which have been ſweet in opinion, have proved bitter in experience; we ſhould therefore ſuſpend our reſolute judgment 'till the trial and event; in the mean while, fear the worſt, and hope the beſt.

CCXI.

There muſt *not* be one uniform proceeding with all men in reprehenſion; but that muſt vary according to the diſpoſition of the reproved. Some men are like thorns, which, eaſily touched, hurt not; but, if hard and unwarily, fetch blood of the hand. Others, as nettles, which, if they be nicely handled, ſting and prick; but, if hard and roughly preſſed, are pulled up without harm.

CCXII.

CCXII.

There are three uſual cauſes of ingratitude upon a benefit received, envy, pride, covetouſneſs. Envy, looking more at others benefit than our own; pride, looking more at ourſelves than the benefit; covetouſneſs, looking more at what we would have, than what we have.

CCXIII.

Envy and hatred are paſſions ſo like each other, that they are often miſtaken for the ſame; and, as many diſeaſes of the body, agree in the like cauſes and effects.

CCXIV.

Envy is ſo malignant in its nature, that it cannot bear the proſperity of others; and, like a diſeaſed eye, is offended with every thing that is bright.

CCXV.

CCXV.

Philoſophy teaches us, that no man ought to be much concerned about death; that riches are confined to the neceſſities of nature; that the happineſs of a man's life doth not conſiſt in the abundance of wealth, or multiplicity of enjoyments, or height of authority and power; but in freedom from ſorrow, in moderation of paſſions, and ſuch a temper of mind as meaſures all things by the uſe of nature.

CCXVI.

A man's praiſes have very agreeable accents in another's mouth, but very flat and diſtaſteful in his own.

CCXVII.

Self-praiſe is not liable to diſgrace or blame, when it is delicately handled by way of apology to remove a calumny or falſe accuſation.

CCXVIII.

CCXVIII.

Thoſe are only to be reputed friendſhips, that are fortified and confirmed by judgment and length of time.

CCXIX.

The eſtimation of good and evil, often-times, in a great meaſure, depend on the opinion we have of them, rather than the things themſelves.

CCXX.

No man was ever ſo compleatly ſkilled, in the conduct of life, as not to receive new information from age and experience; inſomuch, that we find ourſelves really ignorant of what we thought we underſtood, and ſee cauſe to reject what we fancied our trueſt intereſt.

CCXXI.

Many have taught others to deceive, by fearing to be deceived; and, by ſuſpecting

pecting them, have given them a kind of title to do ill.

CCXXII.

Juſtice condemns ſome for a warning to others; "To condemn them "for having done amiſs were folly, "(ſays *Plato)* for what is done can "never be undone;" but it is to the end they may offend no more, and that others may avoid the example of their offence: we do not ſo much correct the man we hang, as we correct others by him.

CCXXIII.

We evade correction, whereas we ought to offer and preſent ourſelves to it; eſpecially when it appears in the form of conference, and not of authority.

CCXXIV.

Benefits are ſo far acceptable, as they

they are in a capacity of being returned; but once exceeding that, hatred is returned inſtead of thanks.

CCXXV.

Amongſt human conditions, it is common enough to be better pleaſed with ſtrange things than our own, and to love innovations and change.

CCXXVI.

We compare ourſelves, in all our fortunes, to what is above us, and ſtill look towards the better; but let us meaſure ourſelves with what is below us, there is no condition ſo miſerable, wherein a man may not find a thouſand examples that will adminiſter conſolation.

CCXXVII.

'Tis a received opinion, that intereſt governs the world: but I believe, whoever looks narrowly into the affairs

fairs of it, will find that paſſion, humour, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thouſand other ſprings, which are oppoſite to ſelf-intereſt, have as conſiderable a part in the movement of this machine.

CCXXVIII.

True courage acts without the leaſt provocation from anger, and is always cool and calm; rage, we know, can make a coward forget himſelf, and fight; but what is done in fury and anger, can never be placed to the account of courage: were it otherwiſe, womankind might claim to be the ſtouteſt ſex, for their hatred and anger have ever been allowed the ſtrongeſt and moſt laſting.

CCXXIX.

In cenſuring another's foibles, it requires great judgment; for reproof is often bitter, and wants a great deal of cau-

caution to ſweeten and correct it. Now this is not to be done by the tempering our own praiſes with the reprehenſion of another, for he is an unworthy and odious fellow who ſeeks his own credit through any man's diſgrace, baſely endeavouring to build a ſlight reputation of his virtue upon the diſcovery of another's crimes.

CCXXX.

A modeſt perſon ſeldom fails to gain the good will of thoſe he converſes with; becauſe nobody envies a man who does not appear to be pleaſed with himſelf.

CCXXXI.

Notwithſtanding all the advantages of youth, few young people pleaſe in converſation; the reaſon is, that want of experience makes them poſitive, and what they ſay is rather with a deſign to pleaſe themſelves than any one elſe.

CCXXXII.

CCXXXII.

A prudent man will avoid talking much of any particular ſcience for which he is remarkably famous; beſides the decency of this rule, it is certainly a good policy. A man, who talks of any thing he is already famous for, has little to get, but a great deal to loſe: it might alſo be added, that he, who is ſometimes ſilent on a ſubject where every one is ſatisfied he could ſpeak well, will often be thought no leſs knowing in other matters, where perhaps he is wholly ignorant.

CCXXXIII.

Love refines a man's behaviour, but makes a woman often ridiculous.

CCXXXIV.

Certainly life is vain, and that man is beyond expreſſion ſtupid, or prejudiced, who, from the vanity of life, can-

cannot gather, that he is deſigned for immortality.

CCXXXV.

Juſtice conſiſts in doing no injury to men, and decency in giving no offence.

CCXXXVI.

The way to avoid the reputation of impudence, is, *not* to be aſhamed of what we do; but never to do what we ought to be aſhamed of.

CCXXXVII.

It coſts us more to be miſerable, than would make us perfectly happy, if we conſider how cheap and eaſy to us is the ſervice of virtue, and how dear we pay for vices.

CCXXXVIII.

A reaſonable man makes his pleaſure the ſauce or entertainment, rather than the buſineſs or ſtudy of his life.

CCXXXIX.

If there were neither fools nor knaves in the world, all people would be of one mind.

CCXL.

Life, as well as all other things, has its bounds aſſigned by nature; and its concluſion, like the laſt act of a play, is old age; the fatigue of which we ought to ſhun, eſpecially when our appetites are fully ſatisfied.

CXLI.

He, who ſeeks his own happineſs, ſhould not be too inquiſitive, or liſten to tale-bearers; for that man, that is over-curious to hear and ſee, multiplies troubles to himſelf: for a man does not feel what he does not know; and he that liſtens after what people ſay of him, ſhall never be at peace.

CCXLII.

True greatneſs of mind acts with meek-

meekneſs and an unaffected humility, but arrogance and cruelty are the diſtinguiſhing marks of a weak and depraved underſtanding.

CCXLIII.

He that is not content in poverty, would not be ſo in plenty; and, let him move his ſituation ever ſo often, he is never the nearer; for his diſeaſe is in his mind, and he carries it with him wherever he goes.

CCXLIV.

Whether had a man better find ſaturity in want, or hunger in plenty?

CCXLV.

Many a man has been ſorry that he ſpoke, but few ever repented their having been ſilent.

CCXLVI.

If you would have another keep your ſecret, keep it yourſelf.

CCXLVII.

The fear of death is a continual ſlavery, as the contempt of it is certain liberty.

CCXLVIII.

Would we conſider the happineſs, which is the reſult of a fatherly conduct towards our ſervants and inferiors, it would ſurely encourage us to that ſort of care, as much as the conſequence of a libertine behaviour to them would ſhock us.

CCXLIX.

The ſame faculty of reaſon and underſtanding, which places us above the brute creation, does alſo ſubject our minds to greater and more manifold diſquiets than creatures of an inferior rank are ſenſible of. It is by this, we anticipate future diſaſters, and often create to ourſelves real pains from imaginary evils, as well as multiply the

the pangs ariſing from thoſe which cannot be avoided.

CCL.

When a prince has once honoured a miniſter with his confidence, for good reaſons he ought never to withdraw it, without manifeſt proof of perfidiouſneſs. It is impoſſible for him to do every thing himſelf, and he muſt therefore have the courage to hazard ſometimes being deceived, rather than miſs opportunities of acting. He ſhould know how to make uſe of men prudently, without giving himſelf up to them blindly: there is a medium between an exceſſive diffidence, and too great a confidence.

CCLI.

In courts, men of the moſt lively imaginations are commonly the leaſt ſolid, and the moſt apt to create broils;

they think every thing due to their ſuperficial talents: under pretence that all men are born equal, they endeavour to confound all ranks, and preach up a chimerical equality, only that they themſelves may get uppermoſt.

CCLII.

It is our behaviour and addreſs, upon all common occaſions, that prejudice people in our favour, or to our diſadvantage; and the more ſubſtantial parts, as our learning and induſtry, cannot poſſibly appear but to few, it is not juſtifiable to ſpend ſo much time in that which ſo very few are judges of, and utterly neglect that which falls within the cenſure of ſo many.

CCLIII.

A wiſe and virtuous man makes the beſt

beſt of every condition, however ſeemingly bad, and turns all things to his advantage.

CCLIV.

Virtue is perfect and immortal, and the foundation of a happy life; it teaches us to know ourſelves and others; it is a peculiar greatneſs of mind, that is never elated or depreſſed with any change of fortune.

CCLV.

No woman is capable of being beautiful, who is not incapable of being falſe.

CCLVI.

As on the one hand we are aſhamed of loving a man whom we cannot eſteem; ſo on the other, though we are truly ſenſible of a man's abilities, we can never raiſe ourſelves to the warmth of friendſhip, without an af-

fectionate good-will towards his perſon.

CCLVII.

We ſhould be watchful, that we do not ourſelves drop into our own praiſes, nor be drawn into them by others: the beſt and moſt certain way of ſecurity is, to look back upon ſuch as we can remember guilty of this fault, and conſider how abſurd and ugly it is accounted by all men, and that nothing can be more diſagreeable in converſation.

CCLVIII.

An honeſt and prudent man will acknowledge that only to be true victory, which he has obtained without violation of his faith, or any blemiſh on his honour.

CCLIX.

The converſation of moſt men is diſ-

diſagreeable, not ſo much for want of wit and learning, as of good breeding and diſcretion.

CCLX.

If you reſolve to pleaſe, never ſpeak to gratify any particular vanity or paſſion of your own, but always with a deſign to divert or inform the company. A man, who only aims at one of theſe, is always eaſy in his diſcourſe; he is never out of humour at being interrupted; becauſe he conſiders, that thoſe who hear him, are the beſt judges whether what he was ſaying could either divert or inform them.

CCLXI.

It is certain, that age itſelf makes many things paſs well enough, which would have been laughed at in the mouth of one much younger.

CCLXII.

CCLXII.

We ſhould be as careful of our words, as our actions; and as far from ſpeaking, as doing ill.

CCLXIII.

We are, in ſome meaſure, more inexcuſable if we violate our duties to a friend, than to a relation; ſince the former ariſes from a voluntary choice, the latter from a neceſſity, to which we could not give our own conſent.

CCLXIV.

As it has been ſaid on one ſide, that a man ought not to break with a faulty friend, that he may not expoſe the weakneſs of his choice; it will doubtleſs hold much ſtronger with reſpect to a worthy one, that he may never be upbraided for having loſt ſo valuable a treaſure which was once in his poſſeſſion.

CCLXV.

CCLXV.

A generous and conſtant paſſion in an agreeable lover, where there is not too great a diſparity in their circumſtances, is the greateſt bleſſing that can befal a perſon beloved, and if over-looked in one, may perhaps never be found in another.

CCLXVI.

We ſhould keep our paſſions from being exalted above meaſure, or ſervilely depreſſed.

CCLXVII.

A covetous man will call himſelf poor, that you may ſooth his vanity by contradicting him.

CCLXVIII.

Men reſemble a perfect being, in nothing ſo much as in doing good to their fellow-creatures.

CCLXIX.

CCLXIX.

It is a principal point of duty, to aſſiſt another moſt, when he ſtands moſt in need of aſſiſtance.

CCLXX.

As knowledge without juſtice, ought to be called rather cunning than wiſdom; ſo a mind prepared to meet danger, if excited by its own eagerneſs, and not the public good, deſerves the name of audacity rather than of courage.

CCLXXI.

The man, who is always fortunate, cannot eaſily have a great reverence for virtue.

CCLXXII.

What is becoming is honourable, and what is honourable is becoming.

CCLXXIII.

It is with our manners as with our health; it is a degree of virtue, the abate-

abatement of vice; as it is a degree of health, the abatement of a fit.

CCLXXIV.

Our reaſon and paſſions are a kind of civil war within us; and which ever of the two is moſt predominant, ſo we are either good or bad.

CCLXXV.

Proſperity, like a fair gale upon a ſtrong current, carries a man in a trice out of the very ſight of peace and quiet; and, if it be not tempered and regulated, is ſo far from eaſing us, that it proves an oppreſſion to us.

CCLXXVI.

What muſt be, ſhall be; and that, which is neceſſity to him that ſtruggles, is little more than choice to him that is willing.

CCLXXVII.

Many a man ſaves his life, by not fear-

fearing to loſe it; and many a man loſes his life, for being over ſollicitous to ſave it.

CCLXXVIII.

A buſy and fortunate man in the world calls many men his friends, that are at moſt but his gueſts; and, if people flock to him, it is but as they do to a fountain, which they both exhauſt and trouble.

CCLXXIX.

All that I would deſire of Providence to beſtow on me, is, ſuch a ſufficiency, that my poverty may not be a burthen to myſelf, or make me ſo to others.

CCLXXX.

The chief intent of correction is to amend the wicked, and to prevent the conſequence of ill example.

CCLXXXI.

He that obſerves the wicked man care-

carefully, will ſee the canker in his heart, however diſguiſed under the appearance of riches and affluence.

CCLXXXII.

The very pleaſure that attends a good action, to a ſenſible unprejudiced mind, would be ſufficient one would think to deter us from doing a bad one, were there no proſpect of hereafter.

CCLXXXIII.

The moſt profligate and abandoned approve of virtue, and would willingly have the reputation, notwithſtanding they have not reſolution enough to purſue it.

CCLXXXIV.

It requires the greateſt caution to look narrowly to ourſelves; that, whilſt we confer praiſes on others, we give no ground for ſuſpicion, that we make them but the vehicles of our own.

CCLXXXV.

CCLXXXV.

That kind of diſcourſe, which conſiſts in diſpraiſing and finding fault, is dangerous, and yields opportunity to thoſe that watch it, for the magnifying their own little worth. Of this, old men are inclinable to be guilty, when, by chaſtiſing and debaſing others for their vices, they exalt themſelves as wonderfully great in the oppoſite virtues.

CCLXXXVI.

We ſhould talk extremely little of ourſelves. Indeed, what can we ſay? It would be as imprudent to diſcover our own faults, as ridiculous to count over our fancied virtues; and our private and domeſtic affairs, are no leſs improper to be introduced in converſation.

CCLXXXVII.

Nothing is more inſupportable to men

men of ſenſe, than an empty formal man, who ſpeaks in proverbs, and decides all controverſies with a ſhort ſentence.

CCLXXXVIII.

Love is generally accompanied with good-will in the young; intereſt in the middle-aged; and a paſſion too groſs to name in the old.

CCLXXXIX.

The endeavours to revive a decaying paſſion, generally extinguiſh the remains of it.

CCXC.

A woman, who, from being a ſlattern, becomes neat; or, from being over neat, becomes a ſlattern, is moſt certainly in love.

CCXCI.

The contemplation of celeſtial things, will make a man both ſpeak and think more ſublimely and mag-

nificently when he deſcends to human affairs.

CCXCII.

When we are once ſettled in a regular courſe of life, we ought to take particular care how we too frequently indulge ourſelves in any of the moſt innocent diverſions and entertainments; ſince the mind may inſenſibly fall off from the reliſh of virtuous actions; and, by degrees, exchange that pleaſure, which it takes in the performance of its duty, for delights of a much inferior and unprofitable nature.

CCXCIII.

If virtue be the end of our being, it muſt either engroſs our whole concern, or at leaſt take place of all our other intereſts.

CCXCIV.

Friendſhip immediately baniſhes envy

envy under all its diſguiſes. A man who can once doubt, whether he ſhould rejoice in his friend's being happier than himſelf, may depend upon it, that he is an utter ſtranger to this virtue.

CCXCV.

A friendſhip, which makes the leaſt noiſe, is very often moſt uſeful; for which reaſon, I ſhould prefer a prudent friend to a zealous one.

CCXCVI.

What duty will a man perform; what praiſe, what honour, will he think worth purchaſing, at the expence of his eaſe, who is perſuaded that pain is the greateſt of all evils? and what ignominy, what baſeneſs, will he not ſubmit to, in order to avoid pain, if he has decreed it the worſt of misfortunes.

CCXCVII.

Love and eſteem are the firſt principles of friendſhip, which always is imperfect where either of theſe two are wanting.

CCXCVIII.

They, who have a firm truſt on the Supreme Being, are powerful in his power, wiſe by his wiſdom, happy by his happineſs; they reap the benefit of every divine attribute, and loſe their own inſufficiency in the fulneſs of infinite perfection.

CCXCIX.

Pitch upon that courſe of life which is the moſt excellent, and cuſtom will render it the moſt delightful.

CCC.

Whether a man intends a life of pleaſure or buſineſs, it is impoſſible to purſue either, in an elegant manner, with-

without the help of good-breeding.

CCCI.

When a nation once loſes its regard to juſtice, or ceaſes to look upon it as ſomething venerable, holy, and inviolable; we may venture to pronounce, that ſuch a nation is haſtening to its ruin.

CCCII.

Juſtice diſcards party, friendſhip, kindred, and is always repreſented as blind, that we may ſuppoſe her thoughts are wholly intent on the equity of a cauſe, without being diverted or prejudiced by objects foreign to it.

CCCIII.

Integrity of mind, as it is anſwerable to itſelf, proportionable, and rational, ſo it is ſolid and durable; and the conſciouſneſs of a juſt behaviour towards mankind in general, caſts a

good reflection on each friendly affection, and raiſes the enjoyment of friendſhip to the height.

CCCIV.

The conſequences of a luxurious indulgence is as fatally detrimental to the body, by producing diſeaſes of many kinds, as it is ſure to render the mind incapable of exerting its faculties, by contracting a ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity: thus, we ſee luxury, riot, and debauchery, are contrary to our real intereſt and the true enjoyment of life.

CCCV.

As to delight in viewing the diſtreſſes and calamities of our fellow-creatures, is the height of brutality; ſo, to take a pleaſure in the torture and pain of any creatures indifferently, is as wholly and abſolutely unnatural,

tural, as it is altogether ſhocking and barbarous.

CCCVI.

Arts and ſciences ſeem ſo well calculated, that they are abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve people from idleneſs, which begets diſcord, effeminacy, and all the train of evils ſo deſtructive to ſociety.

CCCVII.

In reſpect of wit in authors, who endeavour to diſtinguiſh themſelves by raillery and ſatire, it may be laid down as a rule, that an indiſcreet man is more hurtful than an ill-natured one; for the latter will only attack his enemies, and thoſe he wiſhes ill to; whereas, the other injures indifferently both friends and foes.

CCCVIII.

The jealous man's pleaſure, con-

trary to all others, ariſes from his diſappointments; and his whole life is ſpent in purſuit of a ſecret, that deſtroys his happineſs if he chance to find it.

CCCIX.

Reſolution in an aſſaſſin, is, according to reaſon, quite as laudable as knowledge and wiſdom exerciſed in the defence of an ill cauſe.

CCCX.

The praiſe of an ignorant man is only good-will, and you ſhould receive his kindneſs as he is a good neighbour in ſociety, and not as a good judge of your actions in point of fame and reputation.

CCCXI.

However abandoned ſome men may have lived to vice and irreligion, yet ſcarce ever one died a real atheiſt; for, not-

notwithſtanding their wicked courſe of life might make them often wiſh there was no Deity, yet, upon their death-beds, they have acknowledged their infidelity, and not only feared, but believed, the identity of ſuch a Being.

CCCXII.

There are no men, I believe, however hardened in vice, who do not feel a check from that impartial monitor the conſcience, upon commiſſion of any act which is in its nature vile.

CCCXIII.

Death is the wiſh of ſome, the relief of many, and the end of all.

CCCXIV.

Death free us from oppreſſion and violence, and ſecures us from all the injuries of life.

CCCXV.

There is nothing of more pernicious con-

conſequence to the lower part of mankind, than the infamous lives of ſome of thoſe who are ſent for examples, who are ſo deficient in practiſing what they preach, that they are a mock to religion, and a ſanction to vice.

CCCXVI.

True friendſhip is one of the greateſt bleſſings upon earth; it makes the cares and anxieties of life ſit eaſy; provides us with a partner in every affliction to alleviate the burthen, and is a ſure reſort againſt every accident and difficulty that can happen.

CCCXVII.

He that goes to court to find a friend, will often come away without one.

CCCXVIII.

There are two requiſite qualities in the choice of a friend; he muſt be both

both a ſenſible and an honeſt man; for fools, and vicious men, are incapable of friendſhip.

CCCXIX.

That man, that always ſuſpects my honeſty upon every occaſion, gives me a kind of right to cheat him.

CCCXX.

A thorough knowledge of religion, joined to a well-ſpent life, are the infallible preſervatives againſt the fear of death; and not only baniſh thoſe horrors it commonly appears in, but renders the proſpect pleaſing and inviting.

CCCXXI.

The love of life is ſo ſtrongly imprinted in our nature, from our very cradles, that notwithſtanding all the difficulties and diſappointments that attend human life, there is few that part

part with it but with the greateſt reluctance.

CCCXXII.

A wicked man may, ſometimes, evade the law, but never the private conviction of his own conſcience; which will alway ſting him, and be both judge and executioner.

CCCXXIII.

Whatever diſpenſations Providence has thought indiſpenſably neceſſary, it is our duty to comply with, with an unaffected chearfulneſs and reſignation.

CCCXXIV.

No man can be poor that has enough, nor rich that covets more than he has.

CCCXXV.

'Tis a wretched condition to be afraid of every body's tongue, when, in

in reality, we ſhould eſteem ſlander and ill words like arrows ſhot at a diſtance, that glance by us without doing any execution: things are only ill that are ill taken. He that thinks himſelf injured, let him ſay, Either I have deſerved this, or I have not: if I have, it is a judgment; if I have not, it is an injuſtice, and the doer of it has more reaſon to be aſhamed of it than the ſufferer.

CCCXXVI.

We are all members of one body, and it is our duty, and ſhould be as natural for us to help one another, as for the hands to help the feet, or the eyes the hands: without the love and care of the parts, the whole can never be preſerved; and we muſt aſſiſt one another, becauſe we are born for ſociety.

CCCXXVII.

CCCXXVII.

Let this be a rule with us, never to deny a pardon, that does not hurt either the giver or receiver.

CCCXXVIII.

We carry our neighbour's crimes in ſight, but we throw our own over our ſhoulders.

CCCXXIX.

That courage and intrepidity of mind, which diſtinguiſhes itſelf in dangers, if it is void of all regard to juſtice, and ſupports a man only in the purſuits of its own intereſt, is vicious.

CCCXXX.

Every man is ready to give in a long catalogue of thoſe virtues and good qualities he expects to find in the perſon of a friend, but very few of us are careful to cultivate them in ourſelves.

CCCXXXI.

CCCXXXI.

There is a true modeſty, and a falſe modeſty; the firſt avoids doing any thing that is criminal; the latter, every thing that is unfaſhionable: the former is amiable, the other contemptible.

CCCXXXII.

A likeneſs of inclinations in every particular, is ſo far from being requiſite to form a benevolence in two minds towards each other, as it is generally imagined, that I believe we ſhall find ſome of the firmeſt friendſhips to have been contracted between perſons of different humours; the mind being often pleaſed with thoſe perfections that are new to it, and which it does not find among its own accompliſhments: beſides that, a man in ſome meaſure ſupplies his own defects,

fects, and fancies himſelf at ſecond hand poſſeſſed of thoſe good qualities and endowments, which are in the poſſeſſion of him, who, in the eye of the world, is looked on as his other ſelf.

CCCXXXIII.

As ſocial inclinations are abſolutely neceſſary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and intereſt of each individual to cheriſh and improve them to the benefit of mankind.

CCCXXXIV.

We have juſt enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another.

CCCXXXV.

Among men, there are ſome who have their vices concealed by wealth; and others, who have their virtues concealed by poverty.

CCCXXXVI.

CCCXXXVI.

It is an hopeleſs manner of reclaiming of youth, which has been practiſed by ſome moraliſts, to declaim againſt pleaſure in general. No; the way is to ſhew, that the pleaſureable courſe, is that which is limitted and governed by reaſon. In this caſe, virtue is upon equal terms with vice, and has, with all the ſame indulgencies of deſire, the advantage of ſafety in honour and reputation.

CCCXXXVII.

In diſputes or arguments of any ſort, avoid as much as poſſible any words or actions that may appear conceited or full of yourſelf, as it is a ſure way of adding applauſe to your victory; or, ſhould you be pinched in your argument, you may make your retreat with a tolerable grace;

and, as you was not poſitive, you may ſeem glad to be better informed. This has made ſome approve of that way of reaſoning, where, while you ſcarce affirm any thing, you can hardly be caught in an abſurdity, and though poſſibly you are endeavouring to bring over another to your opinion, which is firmly fixed, you ſeem only to deſire information from him.

CCCXXXVIII.

There is ſcarce a ſtate of life, or ſtage in it, which does not produce changes and revolutions in the mind of man: our ſchemes of thought in infancy, are loſt in thoſe of youth; theſe too take a different turn in manhood; 'till old age often leads us back into our former infancy.

CCCXXXIX.

Enquiries after happineſs, and rules for

for attaining it, are *not* ſo uſeful and neceſſary to mankind, as the arts of conſolation and ſupporting one's ſelf under affliction. The utmoſt we can hope for in this world, is contentment. If we aim at any thing higher, we ſhall meet with nothing but grief and diſappointments. A man ſhould direct all his ſtudies and endeavours, at making himſelf eaſy now, and happy hereafter.

CCCXL.

It is a neceſſary, and ſhould be an indiſpenſable rule in life, to contract our deſires to our circumſtances, and whatever expectations we may have, to live within the compaſs of what we actually poſſeſs.

CCCXLI.

Nature delights in the moſt plain and ſimple diet; every animal, but

man, keeps to one diſh. Herbs are the food of this ſpecies, fiſh of that, and fleſh of the third. Man falls upon every thing that comes in his way, never conſidering, that exerciſe and temperance are the beſt preſervatives from moſt of the diſorders incident to mankind; as the former throws off all ſuperfluities, the latter prevents them: exerciſe often prevents a growing diſtemper; temperance ſtarves it.

CCCXLII.

Virtue and decency are ſo nearly related, that it is difficult to ſeparate them from each other, but in our imaginations.

CCCXLIII.

To be indifferent and negligent, in reſpect of what any one thinks of you, diſcovers not only an arrogant temper, but an abandoned diſpoſition.

CCCXLIV.

CCCXLIV.

As it is a part of juſtice never to do violence, ſo it is a mark of modeſty never to commit offence.

CCCXLV.

Falſe humour being intirely void of reaſon, purſues no point, either of morality or inſtruction; but is ludicrous only for the ſake of being ſo.

CCCXLVI.

There is one general miſtake among us in reſpect of educating our children: that in our daughters we take care of their perſons, and neglect their minds; in our ſons we are ſo intent upon adorning their minds, that we wholly neglect their bodies. From this wrong management, we frequently obſerve, a man's life is half ſpent before he is diſtinguiſhed or taken the

leaſt notice of; and, on the other hand, a woman, in the prime of her years, is out of faſhion and neglected.

CCCXLVII.

The variableneſs of that paſſion, which depends ſolely on capriciouſneſs and humour, and undergoes the frequent ſucceſſions of alternate hatred and love, averſion and inclination, muſt of neceſſity create continual diſturbance, and diſguſt and help to pall what is immediately enjoyed in the way of friendſhip and ſociety; and, in the end, extinguiſh in a manner the very inclination towards friendſhip and human commerce.

CCCXLVIII.

There is no paſſion ſo univerſal, or ſteals into the heart more imperceptibly, and covers itſelf under more diſguiſes, than pride; and yet, at the ſame

ſame time, there is not any ſingle view of human nature, under its preſent condition, which is not ſufficient to extinguiſh in us all the ſecret ſeeds of pride, and, on the contrary, to ſink the ſoul into the loweſt ſtate of humility.

CCCXLIX.

Whoever is really brave, has always this comfort when he is oppreſſed, that he knows himſelf ſuperior to thoſe who injure him; for the greateſt power on earth can no ſooner do him that injury, but the brave man can make himſelf greater by forgiving it.

CCCL.

The moſt difficult province in friendſhip, is letting a man ſee his faults and errors; which ſhould, if poſſible, be ſo contrived, that he may perceive our advice is given him, not ſo much to pleaſe ourſelves, as for his own advan-

tage: the reproaches therefore of a friend, ſhould always be ſtrictly juſt, and not too frequent.

CCCLI.

A mind that is ſoftened and humanized by friendſhip, cannot bear frequent reproaches; either it muſt quite ſink under the oppreſſion, or abate conſiderably of the value and eſteem it had for him who beſtows them.

CCCLII.

The proper buſineſs of friendſhip, is to inſpire life and courage; and a ſoul, thus ſupported, out-does itſelf: whereas, if it be unexpectedly deprived of theſe ſuccours, it droops and languiſhes.

CCCLIII.

It is hard for a man to keep a ſteady eye upon truth, who is always in a battle or a triumph.

CCCLIV.

CCCLIV.

To detract from other men, and turn their diſadvantages to our own profit, is more contrary to nature, than death, poverty, or grief, or any thing which can effect our bodies or circumſtances.

CCCLV.

It is a hard and nice ſubject for a man to ſpeak of himſelf; it grates his own heart to ſay any thing of diſparagement, and the reader's ears to hear any thing of praiſe from him.

CCCLVI.

Courage, that grows from conſtitution, very often forſakes a man when he has occaſion for it; and, when it is a kind of inſtinct in the ſoul, breaks out on all occaſions without judgment or diſcretion. That courage, which proceeds from a ſenſe of our duty, and

and from the fear of offending Him that made us, acts always in a uniform manner, and according to the dictates of right reason.

CCCLVII.

A constant fear of death, joined to a continual anxiety for the preservation of life, vitiates all the reliſhes of it, and casts a gloom over the whole face of nature, as it is morally impoſſible we ſhould take any real delight in that which we every moment of our lives are in dread of loſing.

CCCLVIII.

By making the preſervation of life only a ſecondary concern, and the direction of it our principal care, that will be found the beſt method to preſerve life, without being over ſollicitous as to the event; and cannot fail to furniſh us with that felicity, which is the

the perfection of happineſs, by neither fearing or wiſhing for death.

CCCLIX.

Nothing procures a man more eſteem and leſs envy, from the whole company, than if he chooſes the part of a moderator, without engaging directly on either ſide in a diſpute. This gives him the character of impartial, furniſhes him with an opportunity of ſifting things to the bottom, ſhewing his judgment, and of ſometimes making handſome compliments to each of the contending parties.

CCCLX.

All happineſs and ſecurity, in regard to what is future, and all peace, contentedneſs, and eaſe, in reſpect to what is preſent, is forfeited by a too immoderate indulgence of the aſpiring paſſions of the emulous and ambitious.

ous kind; and by having the appetites, towards glory and outward appearance, tranſported beyond a power of command.

CCCLXI.

Though an inclination to eaſe, and a love of moderate ceſſation and reſt from action, be as natural and uſeful to us as the inclination we have towards ſleep; yet an exceſſive love of reſt, and a contracted averſion to action and employment, muſt be a diſeaſe in the mind, equal to that of a lethargy in the body.

CCCLXII.

Humour and ridicule in an ill-natured man, is too often employed in gratifying a barbarous and inhuman wit, by ſtirring up ſorrow and contention, and making whole families unhappy; if, beſides the accompliſhment

pliſhment of being witty and ill-natured, a man is vicious into the bargain, he is one of the moſt miſchievous creatures that can enter into a civil ſociety: his ſatire will chiefly fall on thoſe who ought to be the moſt exempt from it; virtue, merit, and every thing that is praiſe-worthy, will be made the ſubject of raillery and ridicule.

CCCLXIII.

A wiſe man conſiders what he wants, and the fool what he abounds in: the wiſe man is happy when he gains his own approbation, and the fool when he recommends himſelf to the applauſe of thoſe about him.

CCCLXIV.

Men generally of the greateſt and moſt ſhining parts, are the moſt actuated by ambition; and, if we look into

into the two ſexes, we ſhall find this principle of action ſtronger in women than in men.

CCCLXV.

A man, whoſe fortune is plentiful, ſhews an eaſe in his countenance, and confidence in his behaviour, which he, that is under wants and difficulties, cannot aſſume. It is thus with the ſtate of the mind: he that governs his thoughts with the everlaſting rules of reaſon and ſenſe, muſt have ſomething ſo inexpreſſibly graceful in his words and actions, that every circumſtance muſt become him.

CCCLXVI.

As it is an argument of a light mind, to think the worſe of ourſelves for the imperfections of our perſons; ſo it is equally below us, to value our-

ſelves

ſelves upon any advantages we may poſſeſs of that ſort.

CCCLXVII.

No woman can be handſome by the force of features alone, any more than ſhe can be witty only by the help of ſpeech.

CCCLXVIII.

The man of falſe humour, being incapable of any thing but mock repreſentations, his ridicule is always perſonal, and aimed at the vicious man or the writer, not at the vice or the writing.

CCCLXIX.

Learning, like travelling, and all other methods of improving, as it furniſhes good ſenſe, ſo it makes a ſilly man ten thouſand times more inſufferable, by ſupplying variety of matter to his impertinence, and giving

ing him an opportunity of abounding in abſurdities.

CCCLXX.

Pleaſure, when it is a man's chief purpoſe, diſappoints itſelf; and, the conſtant application to it, palls the faculty of enjoying it, though it leaves the ſenſe of our inability for that we wiſh, with a diſ-reliſh of every thing elſe. Thus the intermediate ſeaſons of a man of pleaſure, are more heavy than one would impoſe on the greateſt criminal: he is an utter ſtranger to the pleaſing reflections in the evening of a well-ſpent day, or the gladneſs of heart, or the quickneſs of ſpirit, in the morning after profound ſleep or indolent ſlumbers.

CCCLXXI.

Whilſt we enjoy health, the latter part of life, in the eye of reaſon, is certainly

certainly the moſt eligible. The memory of a well-ſpent youth, gives a peaceable, unmixed, and elegant pleaſure to the mind; and as to all the rational and worthy enjoyments of our being, the conſcience of a good fame, the contemplation of another life, the reſpect and commerce of honeſt men, our capacities for ſuch enjoyments are enlarged by years.

CCCLXXII.

There is no ſociety or converſation to be kept up in the world without good nature, or ſomething which muſt bear its appearance, or ſupply its place: for this reaſon mankind have been forced to invent a kind of artificial humanity, which is what we expreſs by the word good-breeding.

CCCLXXIII.

The appearances of humanity ren-

der a man wonderfully popular and beloved, when they are founded upon real good-nature; but, without it, are like hypocriſy in religion, or a bare form of holineſs, which, when it is diſcovered, makes a man more deteſtable than profeſſed impiety.

CCCLXXIV.

It is moſt ridiculouſly abſurd, to be angry with a man becauſe he does not apprehend the force of your reaſons, or give weak ones of his own: if you argue for reputation, this makes your victory the eaſier; he is certainly, in all reſpects, an object of your pity, rather than anger; and, if he cannot comprehend what you do, you ought to thank nature for her favours, who has given you ſo much the clearer underſtanding

CCCLXXV.

CCCLXXV.

An enthuſiaſt in religion, is like an obſtinate clown; and a ſuperſtitious man, is like an inſipid courtier. Enthuſiaſm has ſomething in it of madneſs, as ſuperſtition has of folly.

CCCLXXVI.

Jealouſly puts a woman often in mind of an ill thing that ſhe would not otherwiſe perhaps have thought of; and fills her imagination with ſuch unlucky ideas, as in time grow familiar, excite deſire, and loſe all the ſhame and horror which might at firſt attend it.

CCCLXXVII.

The gifts of nature, and accompliſhments of art, are valuable only as they are exerted in the intereſts of virtue, or governed by the rules of honour.

CCCLXXVIII.

There is not any paſſion ever been attended with more fatal conſequences, or done more real harm in the world, than a furious miſguided zeal. Zeal, when it diſtinguiſhes itſelf in advancing morality, and promoting the good and mutual happineſs of mankind in general, is laudable and praiſeworthy; but, when the inſtruments he works with are racks and gibbets, when he impriſons mens perſons, confiſcates their eſtates, ruins their families, and burns the body to ſave the ſoul, of ſuch it may be pronounced (whatever he may think of his faith and religion) that his faith is vain, and his religion unprofitable.

CCCLXXIX.

It is an argument of a looſe, ungoverned mind, to be affected with the

the promiſcuous approbation of the generality of mankind; and a man of virtue, ſhould be too delicate for ſo coarſe an appetite for fame. Men of honour ſhould endeavour only to pleaſe the worthy; and the man of merit ſhould deſire to be tried only by perſons of the ſame ſtamp.

CCCLXXX.

In order to keep that temper in the courſe of an argument, which is ſo difficult, and yet ſo neceſſary, you may pleaſe to conſider, that nothing can be more unjuſt or ridiculous, than to be angry with another becauſe he is not of your opinion. The intereſts, education, and means, by which men attain their knowledge, are ſo very different, that it is impoſſible they ſhould all think alike; and he has, at leaſt, as much reaſon to be angry with you,

as you with him. Sometimes, to keep yourſelf cool, it may be of ſervice to aſk yourſelf fairly, what might have been your opinion, had you all the biaſſes of education and intereſt your adverſary may poſſibly have? But, if you contend for the honour of victory alone, you may lay down this as an infallible maxim, that you cannot make a more falſe ſtep, or give your antagoniſt a greater advantage over you, than by falling into a paſſion.

CCCLXXXI.

OEconomy in our affairs, has the ſame effect upon our fortunes, which good-breeding has upon our converſation; there is a pretending behaviour in both caſes, which, inſtead of making men eſteemed, renders them both miſerable and contemptible.

CCCLXXXII.

CCCLXXXII.

Men ſhould beware of being captivated by a kind of ſavage philoſophy, women by a thoughtleſs gallantry: where theſe precautions are not obſerved, the man often degenerates into a cynick, the woman into a coquette; the man grows ſullen and moroſe, the woman impertinent and fantaſtical.

CCCLXXXIII.

No order of perſons ſhould think themſelves too conſiderable to be adviſed; it is not quality, but innocence, which exempts men from reproof: vice and folly ought to be attacked wherever they are met with, and eſpecially when they are placed in high and conſpicuous ſtations of life.

CCCLXXXIV.

Falſe humour delights much in

mimickry; and it is all one to ſuch a man, whether he expoſes, by it, vice and folly, luxury and avarice; or, on the contrary, virtue and wiſdom, pain and poverty.

CCCLXXXV.

He, who is poſſeſſed of falſe notions of humour, is generally wonderfully unlucky, inſomuch, that he will bite the hand that feeds him, and endeavour to ridicule both friends and foes indifferently: for, having but ſmall talents, he muſt be merry where he can, not where he ſhould.

CCCLXXXVI.

A man, who is but a meer ſpectator of what paſſes around him, and not engaged in commerces of any conſideration, is but an ill judge of the ſecret motions of the heart of man; and by what degrees it is actuated, to make ſuch

ſuch viſible alterations in the ſame perſon.

CCCLXXXVII.

There is an authority due to diſtreſs; and, as none of the human race are above the reach of ſorrow, none ſhould be above the hearing the voice of it, however incapable they may be to relieve it.

CCCLXXXVIII.

Too much diffidence or preſumption, upon account of our perſons, are equally faults; and both ariſe from the want of knowing, or rather endeavouring to know ourſelves, and for what we ought to be valued or neglected.

CCCLXXXIX.

To enjoy life and health is a conſtant feaſt; we ſhould not think pleaſure neceſſary; but, if poſſible, to arrive at an equality of mind. It is as

mean

mean to be overjoyed upon occaſions of good fortune, as to be dejected in circumſtances of diſtreſs. Laughter, in one condition, is as unmanly as weeping in the other. We ſhould not form our minds to expect tranſport on every occaſion, but know how to make enjoyment to be out of pain.

CCCXC.

The medium between a fop and a ſloven, is what a man of ſenſe would endeavour to keep; and, if any thing, he ſhould always appear in a dreſs rather above than below his fortune; as a handſome ſuit of cloaths will ſeldom fail of procuring an additional reſpect, eſpecially from the inferior part of mankind (who are the greateſt number) and are too apt to judge from appearances only, without any regard to merit,

merit, or the intrinſic worth of the perſon.

CCCXCI.

There is not a more melancholly object, than a man who has his head turned with religious enthuſiaſm. A perſon that is crazed, though with pride or malice, is a ſight very mortifying to human nature; but when the diſtemper ariſes from any indiſcreet fervours of devotion, or too intenſe an application of the mind to its miſtaken duties, it deſerves our compaſſion in a more particular manner. We may however learn this leſſon from it, that ſince devotion itſelf (which one would be apt to think could not be too warm) may diſorder the mind, unleſs its heats are tempered with caution and prudence, we ſhould be particularly careful to keep

our reaſon as cool as poſſible, and to guard ourſelves, in all parts of life, againſt the influence of paſſion, imagination, and conſtitution.

CCCXCII.

There is a neceſſary caution to be obſerved in reſpect to thoſe who are fond of arguing, that, when you have gained the advantage over your antagoniſt, don't puſh it too far; it is ſufficient to let your adverſary ſee it is in your power, but you are too generous to make uſe of it.

CCCXCIII.

As folly and inconſiderateneſs are the foundation of infidelity, the great pillars and ſupport of it are, either a vanity of appearing wiſer than the reſt of mankind, or an oſtentation of courage in deſpiſing the terrors of another world,

world, which have ſo great an influence on what they call weaker minds; or an averſion to a belief that muſt cut them off from many of thoſe pleaſures they propoſe to themſelves, and fill them with remorſe for many of thoſe they have already taſted.

CCCXCIV.

Juſtice ſeems moſt agreeable to the nature of the Deity, and mercy to that of man. A Being, who has nothing to pardon in himſelf, may reward every man according to his works; but he, whoſe very beſt actions muſt be ſeen with grains of allowance, cannot be too mild, moderate, and forgiving: for this reaſon, among all the monſtrous characters in human nature, there is none ſo odious, nor indeed ſo exquiſitely ridiculous, as that of a rigid ſevere temper in a worthleſs man.

CCCXCV.

CCCXCV.

We generally form ſuch ideas of people at firſt ſight, as we are hardly ever perſuaded to lay aſide afterwards: for which reaſon a man ſhould ſurely endeavour to render his appearance graceful, and remove as far as in him lies whatever may be diſagreeable or uncomely.

CCCXCVI.

In the education of children it muſt be allowed, that ſo much of dancing, at leaſt, as belongs to the behaviour, and an handſome carriage of the body, is extremely uſeful, if not abſolutely neceſſary.

CCCXCVII.

A moderate knowledge, in the little rules of good-breeding, is abſolutely neceſſary, as it gives a man ſome aſſurance, and makes him eaſy in all com-

companies; and, for want of which, many a man of ſenſe and learning has made but an aukward and ridiculous ſort of figure in a polite aſſembly.

CCCXCVIII.

As the entire conqueſt of our paſſions appears ſo difficult a work to ſome, I would adviſe thoſe, who deſpair of it, to attempt a leſs difficult taſk, and only do their endeavours to regulate them.

CCCXCIX.

It is an unaccountable conſideration, that a creature, like man, who is ſenſible of ſo many weakneſſes and imperfections, ſhould be actuated by a love of fame: that vice and ignorance, imperfection and miſery, ſhould contend for praiſe, and endeavour as much as poſſible to make themſelves objects of admiration.

CCCC.

It would be an admirable improvement of what is generally termed good-breeding, if nothing were to paſs among us for agreeable, which was the leaſt tranſgreſſion againſt that rule of life called decorum, or regard to decency.

CCCCI.

There is nothing, which muſt end, to be valued for its continuance: it is thus in the life of a man of ſenſe; a ſhort life is ſufficient to manifeſt himſelf a man of honour and virtue; when he ceaſes to be ſuch, he has lived too long; and, while he is ſuch, it is of no conſequence to him how long he ſhall be ſo, provided he is ſo to his life's end.

CCCCII.

He only is a great man, who can neglect

neglect the applauſe of the multitude, and enjoy himſelf independant of its favour. This is indeed an arduous taſk; but it ſhould comfort a glorious ſpirit, that it is the higheſt ſtep to which human nature can arrive. Triumph, applauſe, acclamation, are dear to the mind of man; but it is ſtill a more exquiſite delight, to ſay to yourſelf, you have done well, than to hear the whole human race pronounce you glorious, except you yourſelf can join with them in your own reflections. A mind, thus equal and uniform, may be deſerted by little faſhionable admirers and followers, but will be ever had in reverence by ſouls like itſelf.

CCCCIII.

Pleaſure, when it ſeizes the whole man, he ſo addicts himſelf to it, that it will not give him leiſure for any

good office in life which contradict the gaiety of the preſent hour. You may indeed obſerve, in people of pleaſure, a certain complacency and abſence of all ſeverity, which the habit of a looſe unconcerned life gives them; but tell the man of pleaſure your ſecret wants, cares, or ſorrows, and you will find he has given up the delicacy of his paſſions to the cravings of his appetite: he little knows the perfect joy he loſes for the diſappointing gratifications he purſues.

CCCCIV.

We cannot be too careful in reſtraining the intoxicating paſſions of youth, leſt the purity of their manners ſhould be ſtained with them; for the firſt ſteps to vice ſeem, too often, to be only innocent amuſements, a civil compliance with cuſtom, and a liberty they muſt

muſt allow themſelves in order to pleaſe; virtue may come, by degrees, to be thought too ſevere an enemy to pleaſure and ſociety, and even contrary to nature, becauſe it oppoſes inclination.

CCCCV.

Virtue, which of all excellencies and beauties, is the chief and moſt amiable; *that*, which is the prop and ornament of human affairs; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendſhip, and correſpondence among men; *that*, by which countries, as well as private families, flouriſh and are happy; and, for want of which, every thing comely, conſpicuous, great, and worthy, muſt periſh and go to ruin. *That ſingle quality*, thus beneficial to all ſociety, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happineſs

and good to each creature in particular; and is *that* by which alone man can be happy, and without which he muſt be miſerable.

BRITISH
17OC71
MUSEUM

An

An Alphabetical Arrangement of Moral Virtues with their oppoſite Vices, and various other Subjects, with proper References to thoſe particular Sentences in which they are diſtinctly treated of.

The Whole together forming

A compleat and copious INDEX.

A

AMBITION, 165, 360, 364.
Anger, 107, 108, 56.
Avarice, *vide* Covetouſneſs.
Arrogance, 242.
Applauſe, 21, 90.
Adverſity, 365.
Atheiſm, 311.
Advice, 143.
Actions, 262.
Argument, 191, 392, 40, 337, 374, 380, 359.

Addreſs, 252.
Arts, 306, 377.
Appearance, 395, 390.
Affliction, 339, 25.

B

BREEDING good, *vide* Good-breeding.
Baſhfulneſs, 80.
Benefits, 224, 212.

C

CONDUCT, 248.
Contemplation, 291.
Care, 164, 151.
Complaiſance, 33, 91, 171.
Confidence, 250.
Courage, 329, 228, 356.
Conſcience, 168, 322, 78, 125.
Content, 47, 201, 243, 111, 163, 146, 147, 184, 360.
Coquetry, 162, 382.
Cruelty, 242, 305.
Cuſtom, 167, 299, 88.
Correction, 280, 223, 211.
Choice, 276, 3.
Covetouſneſs, 267, 165.
Calamities, 60, 68, 83.
Converſation, 260, 230, 189, 231, 287, 193.
Commendation, 192.
Conſure, 229.

D

DEITY, 166, 197, 100, 298.
Death, 51, 313, 314, 320, 247, 105, 29, 106, 357, 358.
Decency, 235, 400, 342.
Duty, 198, 269, 176.
Diverſions, 292.
Detraction, 354.
Diſcretion, 259.
Diſcourſe 260, 232, 159, 190, 285.
Diſtreſs, 387.
Devotion, 25, 1, 181.

E

ESTEEM, 297, 256.
Envy, 213, 214, 37.
Eloquence, 64.
Education, 185, 93, 336. 36, 404, 346, 396.
Emulation, 57.
Enemies, 97, 203.
Enjoyment, 140, 67.
Eaſe, 50.
Egotiſm, 355, 286, 216, 183, 152, 257.
Experience, 66.
Error, 72.
Expectation, 145.
Enthuſiaſm, 391, 375, 41.

F

FEAR, 194, 137, 325, 110, 85, 6, 29, 357, 358.
Fame, 399, 11, 379.
Flattery, 142, 157, 120.
Friendſhip, 13, 316, 317, 318, 103, 330, 297, 294, 295, 332, 350, 351, 352, 263, 264, 218, 84, 144, 182, 34, 126, 347, 38.
Frugality, *vide* Œconomy.
Felicity, 45.
Fortitude, 123.
Faſhion, 124.
Fools, 119, 363.

G

GRATITUDE, 98, 102, 132, 131.
Gallantry, 96, 382.
Good-nature, 20, 7, 372, 373, 39.
Good-breeding, 259, 300, 397, 28, 400, 381.
God, 197, 100, 298.
Goodneſs, 282, 135, 242, 268, 69, 2, 78.
Generoſity, 327.
Greatneſs, 109, 102.
Grief, 209, 151.

H

HONOUR, 271, 112, 113.
Humour, 384, 385, 345, 368.
Honeſty, 112, 113.

Happineſs, 195, 99, 172, 205, 52, 111, 360, 339.
Hope, 137, 6.
Health, 389.
Humanity, 373.

I

INDOLENCE, 361, 343.
Ingratitude, 129, 130, 134, 212.
Injuſtice, 328.
Juſtice, 101, 59, 270, 235, 222, 18, 31, 32, 344, 394.
Jealouſy, 308, 22, 376.
Infidelity, 128, 393.
Inquiſitiveneſs, 241.
Impudence, 236.
Jeſting, 61.
Intereſt, 227.
Inconſtancy, 95, 347.
Irreligion, 19.
Induſtry, 8.
Integrity, 303.

K

KNOWLEDGE, 270, 94, 155.
Ditto, of ourſelves, 388.

L

LOVE, 297, 256, 265, 86, 87, 161, 233, 288, 289, 290, 148, 118, 175.
Luſt, 200, 160.

Learning, 369.
Life, 321, 240, 63, 234, 153, 401, 338.
Luxury, 304.
Laws, 30.

M

MALICE, 36, 180.
Modeſty, 331, 230, 344, 89.
Misfortunes, 141, 208, 60, 226.
Miſery, 170, 237.
Mediocrity, 273, 146, 6.
Marriage, 81.
Miſanthropy, 177, 382.
Manners, 121.
Mercy, 394.

N

NATURE, 377.
Neceſſity, 276.
Novelty, 225.

O

OECONOMY, 150, 381, 340, 89.
Opinion, 219, 227, 210, 366.
Old-Age, 261, 220, 9, 371, 10.

P

PIETY, 116, 41.
Pride, 43, 348, 156.
Prudence, 206.
Philoſophy, 196, 138, 215, 79, 92, 382.
Providence, 323, 279, 166, 149, 8.

Pain,

Pain, 296.
Pleaſure, 204, 238, 94, 117, 370, 403.
Proſperity, 275, 278, 272, 365.
Poverty, 324, 53, 55.
Plenty, 244.
Peeviſhneſs, 58.
Paſſions, 274, 266, 398, 23.
Prude, 62.
Praiſe, 71, 217, 284, 310.
Puniſhment, 74.
Peace, 360.

Q

QUIET, 16.

R

RIDICULE, 362, 384, 385.
Reaſon, 274, 249.
Religion, 169, 315, 320, 334, 82, 35, 92.
Reſolution, 27, 309.
Riches, 207, 324, 55, 70, 94
Revenge, 44.
Raillery, 65, 186.
Reputation, 154.
Ranks, 178, 14.
Reproof, 383, 26.
Reſentment, 23.

S

SUPERSTITION, 41.
Suſpicion, 133, 319, 221.
Silence, 104, 245.
Secreſy, 246.
Society, 326, 333.

Sollicitude, 277, 75.
Sorrow, 183.
Sympathy, 15.
Science, 306.

T

TRUTH, 353, 77.
Temperance, 49, 341.
Temptation, 58.
Travelling, 369.

V

VIRTUE, 254, 283, 48, 199, 282, 293, 335, 127, 5, 35, 173, 114, 115, 116, 174, 405, 4, 342.
Vice, 312, 139, 335, 158, 73, 76, 187, 174.
Valour, 4.
Unanimity, 239, 179.
Victory, 258, 94.
Vivacity, 251,

W

WIT, 122, 307.
Wisdom, 253, 136, 173, 4, 363.
Wickedness, 281.
Want, 244.
Women, 79, 367, 156, 255, 364, 382.

Y

YOUTH, 231, 336, 36, 31, 404, 175, 26, 1,

Z

ZEAL, 378.

FINIS.

BRITISH MUSEUM 170071